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This study was conducted for Naval Air Systems Command,
Cost Analysis Division, under ONR contract number N0001 484WR35075
,
dated 10 January 1984. The work statement which specified the
task to be accomplished reads as follows:
This study will study and respond to criticisms of
our prior efforts, attempt to expand the data base
of competitively acquired major weapon program cost,
and establish whether more specific production capacity
utilization data can be used to improve the precision
of savings estimates produced by a quantification model.
A method for more reliably forecasting capacity utilization
will be specified. The objective is to develop and
document an ea s y - t o- imp lemen t , computer-based model
for forecasting the savings obtainable from competitive
procurement of major weapon systems. The effectiveness
of contractor teaming approach as a competition tool
will be examined. Framework for future research plans
will be established.
This final report, along with a diskette containing programs
for forecasting, is submitted in fulfillment of the contractual
requirement. The diskette is not available for public release.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The aerospace industry capacity utilization rate (CU) was
identified in our earlier study as a strong determinant of weapon
systems cost savings under dual source production competition.
This study reviews and responds to comments on and criticisms
of our earlier efforts, expands the data base for further analysis,
examines the feasibility and desirability of using more firm-specific
measures of CU , and develops a more reliable method of forecasting
the aerospace industry's capacity utilization. This study also
examines the contractor teaming approach as a competitive procurement
tool and develops plans for future research on weapon systems
competition
.
Two observations may be made from our analysis of firm-specific
measures of business conditions. First, none of these alternative
measures consistently satisfied testing for statistical signi-
ficance. Second, for those alternative measures of business
conditions which were significant in an isolated case, the R
values were higher than those obtained using the industry capacity
utilization rate.
One way to interpret these findings is that some firms may
put more weight on alternative measures of business conditions
than on industry capacity utilization in making their pricing
decisions, but different firms opt to use different measures.
It is even possible that different measures may be emphasized
by the same firm at different times.
It can be concluded that, for cost estimation purposes,
the aerospace industry capacity utilization is more reliable
than other measures of business conditions.
iii
Our effort to build a reliable model for projecting aerospace
industry CU resulted in a dynamic model which expresses the
percentage change in capacity (CAP) for the next FY (t+1) as
a function of the present and recent past state of CU and the
percentage change in output (OUT) expected for the next year.
This model proves to be a reliable, accurate forecasting model.
Based on the forecasts shown in Table 3.7, it appears that
conditions will be relatively favorable for dual sourcing during
most of the next decade. However, there will be a brief period
during the mid-to-late eighties during which especially alert
management of the procurement process will be necessary if net
financial benefits are to be expected.
Our analysis has shown that advance knowledge of aerospace
industry capacity utilization can improve the Government's ability
to plan for economical procurements of major weapon systems.
This ability is useful in both cost estimation and procurement
policy-setting
.
The cost savings which result from dual sourcing are a
function of CU and the division of the procurement between the
original supplier and second the source. As CU rises the amount
of the savings declines. The best results have been achieved
when the division is such that the second source is called upon
to supply no more than about 10-15% of the dollar amount of
the procurement: that is, when the division of dollars to the
original source, Dj
, is in a range of 85-90%. The net financial
benefit (NFB) from dual sourcing can be approximated with the
following equation:
IV
NFB = 27.38 - 1.267 CU + .942 D
1
Historically, dual sourcing has generated positive NFBs only
when CU has been below about 80%. But savings should be obtainable
when CU is as high as 85% with proper control of D,
,
When procurements are conducted under sole sourcing the
direction of the impact of CU changes on prices is just the
opposite. A parametric pricing model for missiles which includes
a CU term in addition to the conventional quantity (Q) and production
rate (R) terms was derived:
P = k Q-- 327 R-- 339 CU" 1 ' 205
This model should enable the use of CU forecasts to assist in
the refinement of cost estimates when a procurement is to be
conducted using sole sourcing.
We were able to identify several additional programs that
appear to be suitable for inclusion in studies of dual source
competition procurement. A quick validation check was performed
for each of the additional programs and none of the results
contradicted our basic conclusion that the aerospace industry
capacity utilization (CU) is a strong determinant of savings
from dual-sourcing
.
Appendix B contains a separate report which examines the
contractor teaming approach as a competitive procurement tool.
Suggested plans for future research on weapon systems competition
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A BRIEF REVIEW OF PRIOR WORK
Aerospace industry capacity utilization was identified
in our earlier studyl as a strong determinant of weapon systems
cost savings under dual source production competition. This
study reviews and responds to comments on and criticisms of
our earlier efforts, expands the data base for further analysis,
and develops a more reliable method for forecasting production
capacity utilization. This study also examines the contractor
teaming approach as a competitive procurement tool and develops
plans for future research on weapon systems competition.
In this chapter, we will provide a brief summary of our
earlier work. We will also review and respond to comment and
criticism .
SUMMARY OF PRIOR EFFORTS
Using economic theory as the conceptual underpinning, we
hypothesized that the price the Government has to pay for major
weapon systems is dependent on, apart from the well known learning
curve phenomenon, the degree of competition. The degree of compe-
tition, in turn, may be a function of the firm's general business
condition and the alternatives available to it.
As a simple check of the plausibility of the hypothesis,
the data reported in Table 1.1 were assembled. The program
'•W. R. Greer, Jr., and S. S. Liao, "Cost Analysis for Dual Source
Weapon Procurement," Naval Postgraduate School Technical Report,
NPS54-83-011
, October 1983. (A135351)
savings (loss) data were taken from a report prepared by the
Sciences Application Inc. 2 (SAI) The capacity utilizations
were averages of the annual figures for the aerospace industry
for the years during which dual source procurement was in effect
for each program.
Table 1.1













Source: * Beltramo and Jordan [1982]












Our interpretation of this preliminary check was that it
tends to support the general hypothesis. Greater savings do
appear to have resulted from competition when industry capacity
utilization was relatively low. Encouraged by these results,
2m
.
N. Beltramo and D. W. Jordan, "A brief Review of Theory,
Analytical Methodology, Data, and Studies Related to Dual Source
Competition in the Procurement of Weapon Systems," (Preliminary
report), Division of Cost Analysis (MAT-01F4), Headquarters,
Naval Material Command, 27 August 1982.
we went ahead with the actual analysis of the determinants affecting
the price paid by the Government for weapon systems.
Most recent attempts to sharpen our cost estimation abilities
have focused on adding a production rate term to the conventional
learning curve model. 3 y e replace the production rate term
with a capacity utilization term and added an additional parameter
to capture the effect of different forms of competition (dual
source or winner-take-all).
We felt that the result of this attempt should be compared
for performance with the best learning curve/production rate
model we could construct. Due to the limited number of histories
for major weapon systems which have been dual sourced , the only
available data for testing the two models' performance was the
set used for the derivations. The basic plan of the test was
to use each model to forecast at the onset of procurement what
the total procurement cost "will be" for each of the seven programs,
then to compare the actual cost to the forecast. From Table 1.2,
one can clearly see that the capacity utilization model has
outperformed the rate model in every test. The average arithmetic
and absolute errors are lower for both versions of the capacity
utilization model than for either version of the rate model.
In addition, the lower standard deviations (shown in parentheses)
indicate the program-to-program variations of actual from forecasted
cost are also lower for the capacity utilization model. We
-'C . H. Smith, "Production Rate and Weapon System Cost: Research
Review, Case Studies, and Planning Model," U . S. Army Procurement








Mean Arithmetic Percentage Error:
If Median Parameters are used 27.2
(93.1)
If Mean Parameters are used 41.4
(81.7)
Mean Absolute Percentage Error:
If Median Parameters are used 64.3
(68.6)














view this outcome as strong support for our original hypothesis
that industry capacity utilization is a strong determinant of
major weapon system prices under competitive procurement.
In short, the major conclusion of our prior work is that,
while the production costs of weapon systems are affected by
a host of factors, including cumulative quantity and production
rate, these variations alone do not explain the full variation
in prices paid by the Government. Based on our statistical
analysis, we find a major price determinant (neglected by previous
researchers) to be the state of industry capacity utilization.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the evolution of competition
studies and contrast our approach with prior studies.
(a) Learning Effect Not Considered
Unit




















Figure 1.1 Evolution of Competition Studies
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Figure 1.2 General Economic Condition As A Price Determinant
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Given the limited data base for dual source weapon systems
research, the task faced by an analyst is to identify dominant
factors. Our analysis showed that industry capacity utilization
can be used as a proxy of general business conditions, along
with the learning curve effect, to explain the change in the
prices of weapons systems procured under dual source competition.
SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND REVIEWS ON OUR PRIOR WORK
In addition to the presentation to the sponsors (NAVAIR
and NAVCOMPT), the results of our prior work were presented,
in part or in their entirety, at the DARE (Defense Acquisition
Research Elements) meeting and the Federal Acquisition Research
Symposium. While the great majority of reactions were favorable,
there have been comments and criticisms that merit further atten-
tion. Some comments are constructive in nature, while others,
although well intentioned, appear to stem from misunderstanding.
Although the results of our prior work are all defensible statis-
tically, it is necessary to examine all available comments to
determine which should be incorporated into our model and which
should not .
Two written reports were prepared by SAI.4 The general
comments may be classified into the following categories:
(1) Definition of risk and riskiness of defense business.
^M . N. Beltramo and D. W. Jordan, "A Review of Material Prepared
by NPS for NAVAIR on Dual Source Competition," Science Applications,
Inc., 20 September 1983, and "A Detailed Review of Cost Handbook
for Dual-Source Weapons Procurement," Science Applications,
Inc., 5 November 1983.
(2) Profit reduction and the erosion of defense industrial base.
(3) Amortization of fixed cost and profit variation.
(4) The necessary requirements for dual sourcing.
(5) The relationship between production cost and production
quantity
.
(6) The validity of using an approximate capacity index.
(7) The ability to forecast industry capacity utilization.
(8) The reliability of parameter values due to the limited
data available .
(9) The time lag between negotiated sales and deliveries.
(10) Inappropriate test of model performance.
(11) The use of the "80% rule."
(12) The need for recalculation of Savings/losses figures.
In this section, we will discuss the comment and criticism
in detail .
Definition of Risk and Riskiness of Defense Business
SAI criticized our earlier work for failing to explicitly
define risk, and argued that risks should be related to potential
loss of capital. According to this definition, SAI argued that
defense business is not risky relative to commercial business
because of four peculiar arrangements in major weapon system
contracting: (1) government-funded development cost, (2) government-
funded facilities and government-furnished equipment, (3) cost-




Risk is a concept which is frequently referred to in normal
everyday social interchange. It is a concept which is easy
to understand but difficult to define. For decision model appli-
cation, a definition more relevant to the decision in question
is necessary. Defining risk as relating to potential loss of
capital is, of course, valid; but it is most relevant when making
an initial capital investment decision. For an aerospace company,
already in the defense business, the decision is not whether
to enter the defense business and run the risk of losing the
investment. Instead, the more relevant decision is how much
in the way of resources, including fixed assets and working
capital, should be allocated to the defense sector; that is,
how much defense business should the firm be willing to handle.
Clearly, the choice is not one of entry but rather one of alloca-
tion. For this reason, we chose to use three different definitions
of risk .
First, we viewed risk from inside the firm, through the
eyes of management, by stressing that management must budget
cash flows and exhibit appealing pictures of net income growth.
These tasks are made easier if earnings are stable and predictable.
Second, we tried to view risk through the eyes of the financial
markets by examining the total risk as measured by Value Line
with its "Price Stability Index". In both cases, the result
consistently showed that higher risk measures are associated
with higher percentages of government business. Although the
third definition of risk, beta (systematic risk), is not signifi-
cantly correlated with higher percentages of government business
among aerospace firms, we did find the betas for aerospace firms
to be higher than the market average. Thus, in the context of
resource allocation, government business generally is considered
both by management and the financial markets to be riskier, or
less desirable, than other segments of business in the aerospace
industry
.
It should be noted that how the concept of risk should be
defined is not a central issue. We can even say that risk is
not a relevant issue. We used risk as a convenient but not
a necessary tool to denote the variability of profit.
Even if we accept SAI ' s definition of risk, defense business
still is not as attractive as SAI indicated . Even though contractors
are eventually reimbursed for facility investment, the contractor's
reluctance to invest in facilities is evident in Defense Procurement
Circular 76-3. What is relevant to the contractor is the actual
capital used on a given contract, which is difficult to determine^
and is almost always under-reimbursed by the Department of Defense.
6
Profit Reduction and the Erosion of the Defense Industrial Base
The SAI report7 maintained that further reductions of profits
through driving hard bargains when industry capacity utilization
is low would be likely to accelerate the erosion of the defense
^Air Force Systems Command, "Profit Study '82," Summary Report,
Andrews Air Force Base, undated.
"Simonson, G. R., "Misconceptions of Profit in Defense Policy,"
National Contract Management Journal
,
Winter 1982, Vol. 15,
issue 2 .
'Beltramo and Jordan, "A Review," cp. cit.
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industrial base. SAI's position was that the cost component
of the price of weapon systems normally accounts for more than
90% of the government's expenditure for a product, and that
any reduction in price must come in the form of greater efficiency.
A necessary condition for SAI's position to be valid is
that the cost and profit figures can be determined with a reasonable
degree of accuracy. On the surface this is a reasonable assumption,
as cost and profit figures are routinely scrutinized by contract
negotiators and contract auditors. However, there is a fallacy
rarely recognized by users of accounting data. The precise
numbers contained in accounting reports give an aura of accuracy
to the numbers. In reality, as we pointed out in our earlier
report, the cost of a product cannot be precisely determined.
It can only be approximated by using a series of relatively
subjective allocations. As a result, the cost of producing
a product is the figure both parties agree to accept rather
than some "true" cost. By the same token, the profit figure
is as subjective as the cost figure, as several researchers
have found. 8 Therefore, a lower price may come in the form
of lower profit or lower cost, or both. What we have suggested
is that greater price reductions are obtained when industry
capacity utilization is low ; but we also emphasized that "they
(program managers) should resist the natural temptation to take
overzealous advantage of lulls in capacity utilization to drive
^Hoppe, D. R., "Dual Award and Competition: You Can Have Both,"
Air Force A-10 System Program Office; Myers, M. G., McClenon,
P. R.,andTayloe,H. M., "Price Competition in the DoD," Washington,
D. C.: Logistics Management Institute, 19S2.
11
'hard bargains,' and buy goods at very low profit margins. "9
Amortization of Fixed Cost and Profit Variation
SAI researchers offered a different interpretation of the
relationship between the profitability of DoD contracts and
capacity utilization. They argued that:10
When capacity utilization is high, contractors may
make higher profits as a result of amortizing fixed
costs over a large output quantity; whereas when capacity
is low, fixed costs must be amortized over a relatively
low quantity. Thus, the conclusion chat program managers
may drive "hard bargains" during times of low capacity
is not proven by the analysis.
This interpretation would be valid had we measured the profit-
ability of DoD contracts independent of commercial business.
However, in our earlier work, we measured the profitability
of DoD contracts in relation to the profitability of commercial
business. Thus, the change in profit should be proportional
in both sectors when the fixed costs are amortized over more
or fewer units and the profitability of DoD contracts relative
to commercial business should be stable. Our study showed that
this relative profit changes in the same direction as changes
in industry capacity utilization. There are two possible inter-
pretations for this phenomenon. First, defense contractors
have been able to obtain higher profits from the government
when the general business environment was favorable. Second,
the government may have been bearing a disproportionate share
of contractors' indirect cost, and when their larger share of
^Greer and Liao, op. cit
. ,
p. 5.8.
l°Beltramo and Jordan, "A Detailed Review," op. cit., pp. 13-14.
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indirect cost is spread over more units, its impact on profit
from defense work is more significant.
Both Willingness and Ability Are Necessary for Competition
SAI's report criticized that we assume the ability to compete
is guaranteed by the technology transfer process. H This is,
of course, to set up a straw man and attack it. Chapter 1 of
our earlier report clearly emphasized that both willingness
and ability are necessary requirements for compet i t ion . 1 2 £s
discussed in our report, we found that willingness to compete
may be reasonably approximated with a surrogate measure such
as industry capacity utilization. Naturally, willingness to
compete became the focus of our study, which is quantitative
in nature. Ability to compete, on the other hand, is technological
in nature. As in most research dealing with weapon systems
competition we list it as a necessary requirement, but did not
attempt to quantify it.
Cost/Quantity Relationships
There was no direct criticism of our findings in this area.
However, in their report, SAI repeatedly maintained that dividing
production between two sources causes potential economies of
scale that might have been available to a single source producing
a larger quantity to be forgone. 13 Explicit and implicit in
l
-'Bel tramo and Jordan, "A Review," op. cit .
,
p. 6.
l^Greer and Liao , op. cit., p. 1.4.
l^Beltramo an ^ Jordan, "A Review," op. cit., pp. 7-9.
13
their discussion is that findings not consistent with their
hypothesis are illogical. However, various researches have
documented increase, decrease, or no change in cost when production
quantities were varied. We approached the issue with an open
mind and attempted to incorporate the production rate into our
model. However, the conclusion is that the statistical significance
of a production rate term cannot consistently be substantiated.
The explanation for this conclusion was discussed in detail
in our earlier report.
The Validity of Using An Approximate Capacity Index
Our use of the Federal Reserve Board's aerospace industry
capacity utilization index as a measure of contractors' willingness
to compete was criticized. SAI argued that the FRB defines
the Aerospace Industry to also include miscellaneous transportation
equipment and that the correct industry should be Ordnance.
We obtained the industry capacity utilization data from
an FRB printout, and were aware of what detailed information
was available and what were included in each industry group.
The aerospace industry as defined by the FRB was as specific
as could be obtained. The FRB does not have capacity utilization
data for the "Ordnance" industry. Therefore we could not verify
whether it would or would not be more appropriate (or statistically
more significant) than the aerospace data used in our prior
work. It should be noted that OSD ' s Defense Economic Impact
Modeling System (DEIMS, 1982) used Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) #3761 for missiles, SIC #3721 for aircrafts, and SIC #
3724 for aircraft engines and parts, all sharing the same prefix
14
of #37. Ordnance and ammunition was classified by DEIMS as
a subgroup of fabricated metal product industry, with a SIC
# 34 prefix. Further evidence of the appropriateness of using
the aerospace industry for our analysis can be seen in The Stati-
stical Abstract of The United States , which groups missiles
and space vehicles in the same category as aircraft and aircraft
engines
.
Criticisms such as these, however, really missed the point,
and manifest a misunderstanding of our attempt to use a measure
of general business conditions to quantify the willingness to
compete. For example, SAI argued that "plant utilization and
equipment utilization within a plant related specifically to
the particular end item in question may be as important or more
important." To prove their point, SAI researchers went on at
length to calculate the plant utilization rate, but found no
correlation between plant utilization and industry capacity
utilization. All this can prove is that there is no statistically
significant correlation between the end item price and the utili-
zation of the plant in which the item was produced. Why might
this be the case? One must realize that plant utilization has
a significant bearing on the rate at which factors of production
are consumed, but not on the general business conditions . W e
have shown that the production rate is not a significant price
determinant under dual-source procurement, therefore, we did
not expect SAI's attempt to prove otherwise.
The Ability to Forecast Industry Capacity Utilization
The usefulness of our model depends on the availability
15
of a reliable capacity utilization forecasting model. SAI argued
that the decision to establish a second source requires long
lead time and any forecast of industry capacity utilization
that far in advance may be so speculative as to be meaningless.
Dismissing the usefulness of a model before it is polished is
premature, of course. Even with a simple time series forecasting
technique, we have demonstrated that our model outperforms other
currently available models. One of our main focuses in this
current study is to explore the possibility of developing a
more reliable capacity utilization forecasting model.
The reliability of parameter values
SAI maintained that some of the data supplied by them to
us may have been inappropriate for other than case study purposes.
They discussed three of the seven cases in which competitive
split buys probably did not exist. What were described, however,
were symptoms rather than causes. They did not contradict our
findings
.
SAI researchers also argued that learning curve slopes vary
significantly among the cases examined and it makes no sense
at all to prescribe a learning curve slope for a model. The
reader should note that averaging the slope was done for purpose
of testing the performance of our model by assuming that the
second sourcing decision was to be made very early in the program
when there was no specific information about the learning curve.
Nowhere in our report did we suggest that the parameter values
were to be used as they are. In fact, it was noted that the
16
parameter values should be altered when more specific information
is available . 14
Time Las between Negotiated Sales and Deliveries
SAI researchers maintained that the correlation between
capacity utilization and price paid by the government remains
an unproven hypothesis because of data problems related to the
"industry" and the varying lag time between negotiated sales
and de 1
i
ver i e s . 1 5 The former was clarified earlier and the
latter was mitigated by our use of smoothed data. Our use of
the resistant time series smoother followed by a simple Hanning
running, averagelo was partly designed to handle time lag problems
and partly to take into consideration the fact that managerial
decisions are not made on the basis of single year data but
are more likely to be on the basis of a multi-year perspective.
We cannot claim to have eliminated the time lag problem, but
its effect was minimized. In fact, we tried both unsmoothed
and smoothed data and the latter consistently outperformed the
former .
Inappropriate Test of Model Performance
SAI researchers argued that "to properly test whether an
industry capacity utilization concept can more reliably estimate
l^Greer and Liao
,
op. cit., p. 5.6.
l-^Beltramo and Jordan, "A Detailed Review," op. cit., p. 13.
'•"See P. Velleman, "Definition and Comparison of Robust Nonlinear




dual source competition costs than a production rate model,
both models should be of similar form (i.e., either include
or exclude the M and N dummy variables from both models). "17
This is, of course, another example of misunderstanding of the
industry capacity utilization concept. M and N (dummy variables
used denote split-buy or winner-take-all competition) were as
much an integral part of the capacity utilization model as U
(capacity utilization rate). In fact, the value of M depends
on the value of U. To include M and N in other models would
necessarily incorporate the capacity utilization concept in
the model
.
Although not presented in our earlier report, the following
combination of variables were tested:
A. Learning curve (LC)
B. LC plus production rate
C. LC and capacity utilization
D. LC
,
rate, and capacity utilization
Our attempt was to see if adding the capacity utilization to
existing decision models would improve their performance. In
theory, adding a significant explanatory variable to a regression
model should improve the results. However, we found that (D)
did not perform nearly as well as (C). This can easily be ex-
plained. As we mentioned earlier, production rate is a highly
plant-specific variable. The effect of doubling production
can be drastically different between two plants, making the
variable unsuitable for a statistical model such as ours. Further,
1'Beltramo and Jordan, "A Detailed Review," op, cit., p. 15.
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the number of data points for each program tends to be very
limited. Adding one more variable means losing a degree of
freedom. Therefore, a critical choice in any attempt to develop
a statistical model is to select- only the dominant variables
rather than attempting to include all possible variables.
"on^80% Rules" Leaves No Margin for Forecasting Error
SAI researchers argued that "the '80% rule' leaves almost
no margin for forecasting error as a winner is observed at a
capacity utilization of 76.2 and losers are observed at 81.6
and 82. 3. "18 They further argue that "if the government used
an industry capacity utilization index and capacity level rule
(e.g., 80% rule) to assist in the sole source/ dual source deter-
mination, contractors could easily game the situation to the
government's d isad v an t a ge . " 19 One must realize that the "80%
rule" was based on a preliminary hypothesis check to determine
at what point in time the dummy variable M should take on the
value "1." The actual sole source/dual source decision still
depends on the results of analysis using the equation developed
in Chapter 4 of our earlier report. We have not tested the
sensitivity of the capacity utilization term. Therefore, the
criticism is premature and purely conjectural in nature.
As to the possibility of gaming by the contractor, the criticism
is as valid as criticizing the Internal Revenue Service for
developing a decision criterion to select tax returns for audit
18 Ibid., p. 17.
19 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
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on the ground that taxpayers will cheat the government by using
the decision criterion to their advantage.
Recalculation of Competition Savings/Losses
SAI researchers pointed out to us that the savings/losses
from competition shown in their report20 include both competitive
split buys as well as winner-take-all awards. To examine only
the impact of the competitive split buys, they recalculated
the sa vin g s / los se s . The original and recalculated figures,
along with the capacity utilization index, are shown below:
Table 1.2

































Source: * Beltramo and Jordan, "A Brief Review," op. cit.
# Beltramo and Jordan, "A Detailed Review," op. cit.
+ Federal Reserve Board
20Beltramo and Jordan, "A Brief Review," op. cit
20
We used these numbers as a preliminary plausibility check of
our hypothesis. It is evident that either column of savings
(losses) figures would lead to the same logical conclusion.
Summary
In summary, we conclude that the SAI researchers' criticisms
of our earlier work stem partly from their misunderstanding
of the capacity utilization concept and partly from their using
preconceived conclusion to judge a statistical model. The bulk
of their criticism may be explained away if one realizes that
the capacity utilization concept introduced in our earlier work
was a surrogate measure of aerospace contractors' general business
environment rather than a specific plant's equipment or capacity
utilization. We followed standard statistical methods, and
the data used in our analysis were reproduced for ease of repli-
cation. Since the findings are statistically significant, the
result should not be criticized for failing to support someone
else's preconceived hypothesis, unless the methodology is defective.
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Chapter 2
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF BUSINESS CONDITIONS
In this chapter, we examine to see if the use of other alter-
native measures of business conditions or firm-specific measures
of capacity utilization rather than composite capacity utilization
for the aerospace industry would be more reliable for cost estimation
purpose .
FIRM-SPECIFIC MEASURES
Virtually everyone who read our first report [Greer and
Liao
, 1983] suggested that the capacity utilization rate of
the specific firm in question would be a better measure of the
firm's business condition. This is certainly possible, as a
firm with a lot of idle capacity may be hungry for business
and may submit a bid price lower than it would have had it been
busy. On the other hand, a firm may survey the industry in
general and its main competitors in particular and determine
that real competition does not exist because other firms in
the industry are busy. Under this circumstance, a firm with
idle capacity will not necessarily lower its bid price to a
significant degree in order to win business because the pressure
for business from potential competitors is not high. These
are theoretical conjectures, of course. The issue must be examined
empirically. In this section, we discuss firm-specific measures
used in the empirical test.
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In addition to the Federal Reserve Board, which collects
capacity and output information from firms on a monthly basis,
the Bureau of Census and Bureau of Labor Statistics also collect
capacity utilization data at longer intervals. However, all
three organizations cited confidentiality as the reason and
declined to disclose firm-specific data.
None of the firms contacted by the investigators was willing
to disclose the needed information. Therefore, the only feasible
source of information is the financial data compiled by investment
service organizations.
Relevant data for those firms involved in the seven programs
discussed earlier were extracted from Moody's Industrial Survey
and Value-Line Investment Survey . Four variables are potentially
useful in measuring a firm's capacity utilization: sales, cost
of goods sold, gross plant assets, and net plant assets. The
cost of goods sold was subsequently eliminated due to its colli-
nearity with sales. The remaining variables were expressed
in ratio form to reflect the extent of plant asset utilization: (1)
gross plant assets over sales and (2) net plant assets over
sales
.
A number of contractors are subsidiaries of large conglomerates
or privately held. Meaningful data were not publicly accessible,
resulting in several cases of missing data.
INDUSTRY SALES, NEW ORDERS, AND BACKLOGS
The Statistical Abstract of the United States reports three
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categories of business condition measures for the aerospace
industry: net new orders, net sales, and backlog. It includes
aircraft and parts, aircraft engines and parts, missiles and
parts, and other related products and services. Data prior
to 1960 were not properly segregated for this study, this accounts
for the missing data in the empirical test section.
EMPIRICAL TEST
Data discussed above were compiled and adjusted to constant
dollars for testing. To see if the use of above mentioned alter-
native measures of business conditions would improve the cost
estimation in major weapon systems acquisition, we first determine
whether or not each of the alternative measures would be a 'signi-
ficant explanatory variable in the standard regression equation.
The regression model has the following general form:
(2.1)P = kQ aM b
P, of course, is the unit price for each buy. The Q term is
the familiar mid-point quantity associated with each buy, as
used in the conventional learning curve model. The M term is
the alternative measure of business conditions discussed above.
Each of the alternative measures was substituted into the model
to see if the t-value associated with the term was significant.
The results are shown in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1 T-Ratios for Alternative Measures
Gross Net
Plant Plant Net New Critical










Bullpup * * * *
MK-46 7.79 # * *
Sparrow # * * *
Rockeye ? ? ? ?
Shillela gh ? ? ? ?
Sidewind er ? ? ? ?

























An examination of the t-ratio in table 2.1 shows that the
alternative measures were significant in only four of the seven
cases with sufficient data for testing. To see if the use of
alternative measure in these four cases would be more reliable
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than the aerospace industry capacity utilization (CU) rate for
cost estimation purposes, a comparative analysis was done by
examining the coefficient of determination, or R2 value. This
value indicates how well the variables in the regression equation
explains the variation in the unit price. The R2 value, adjusted
for the degree of freedom, for each of the four cases are listed
in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 R2 Values for CU and Alternative Measures
R2 Values
Program Con tr ac tor
MK-46 Aerojet 32.7 47.1 (Gross plant assets/Sales
Bullpup Maxon 60.7 99.4 (Net industry sales)
Sidewinder Raytheon 49.2 81.1 (Net industry sales)
(Gross plant assets/Sales
Sparrow General 95.5 97.9 (Net plant assets/Sales)
Dynamics (New orders)
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we examined the feasibility and desirability
of using alternative measure of business conditions as an explanatory
variable in major weapon systems cost estimation models. Two
observations may be made from the analysis. First, none of
the alternative measures was consistently significant across
the programs. Second, for those alternative measures of business
conditions which were significant in a specific case, the R2






One way to interpret these findings is that some firms may
put more weight on alternative measures of business conditions
than on the industry capacity utilization measure for their
pricing decisions, but different firms opted to use different
measures. It may even be likely that different measures may
have been emphasized by the same firm at different times.
Apart from the statistical significance of a variable, one
must also judge the usefulness of a variable by the ease of
access to the needed data. From the standpoint of timely reporting,
industry capacity utilization has a clear advantage over alternative
measures, as the Federal Reserve Board release the data on a
monthly basis. It may be concluded that, for cost estimation
purposes, the aerospace industry capacity utilization is more
reliable than other measures of business conditions.
Now that we have concluded that knowledge of the state of
capacity utilization in the aerospace industry is an important
component of program management, how is one to know prior to
the moment of introducing a second source just what capacity
utilization situation will be? It is necessary to forecast.
The next chapter examines forecasting techniques.
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Chapter 3
FORECASTING AEROSPACE INDUSTRY CAPACITY UTILIZATION
It seems clear by now that the aerospace industry capacity
utilization rate is a major price determinant of major weapon
systems when the procurement is conducted under competition.
The explanatory power of our model is evident. Knowledge of
the state of capacity utilization in the aerospace industry
is essential in the acquisition of major weapon systems under
competition .
We formerly attempted to use a Box-Jenkins time series model,
or the so-called ARIMA model, to forecast monthly aerospace
industry capacity utilization rates with only limited success.
In this chapter, we will discuss our current efforts to develop
a reliable forecasting technique to predict capacity utilization.
A CLOSER LOOK AT CAPACITY
The capacity utilization rate, as reported by the Federal
Reserve Board, is determined by dividing the capacity by the
output of the industry. This suggests that, to forecast the
capacity utilization rate of an industry, one must consider
both output and capacity. This idea may be captured in a simple
model
:
CU t+1 = f[CU t , Delta(OUTPUT t+ i) , Delta (CAP t+ i ) ] (3.1)
The model implies that the current state of capacity utilization
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(C^Ot an d the expected change in output and capacity (CAP)
should jointly determine that status of capacity utilization
for next year ( t + 1 ) . We may hypothesize, however, that some
sort of relationship exists between the two unknown variables
on the right hand side of the model, changes of output and capacity.
The business community is obviously interested in forecasting
output . Indeed, it is logical to assume that output forecasts
become a basis for making decisions to alter existing amounts
of capacity. If an industry anticipates declines in output,
it is likely to allow its capacity to remain static or even
to shrink. If firms expect improving business conditions, i.e.,
if increases in output are anticipated, then they are more likely
to expand capacity. Thus, we may further hypothesize that
Delta(CAP t+1 ) = f[CU t , Delta(OUTPUT t+1 )] (3.2)
Eq. 3.2 suggests that when deciding by what amount to change
capacity for the next period (t+1), the firm will consider its
present (t) state of CU and the anticipated change in output.
If this relationship proves to be correct, then Eq. 3.1 may
be simplified as follows:
CU t+ l = f[CU t , Delta(OUTPUTt+l)] (Eq. 3.3)
This model implies that, given the present state of CU, the
expected capacity utilization in the industry may be predicted
from the expected change in output in the next period. Thus,
a prerequisite for projecting the capacity utilization rate
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is the determination of the parameters for Eq . 3.2. The next
section deals with this issue.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPACITY AND OUTPUT CHANGES
To derive the parameter for Eq . 3.2, our intuition tell
us to expect positive association for both variables, i.e.,
positive changes in capacity are relatively more likely to occur
when CU is high, and when large increases in output are expected.
It is important to recognize that the usefulness of Eq. 3.2
will ultimately depend on an implicit prerequisite condition
that forecasts of changes in output are available. In this
sense, this model really constitutes a transposition of existing
forecasts. For now, we will assume that accurate output
forecasts are available so that we can assess the performance
of the model alone. The issue of output forecasts will be discussed
later in the chapter
.
Data
Table 3.1 shows the data for capacity, output, and capacity
utilization for fiscal years 1954 through 1983. The data were
compiled from the quarterly figure reported by the Federal Reserve
Board and converted to fiscal year averages in conformity with
the Federal Government fiscal calendar.
The columns labelled "capacity utilization," "capacity,"
and "output" were converted from the Federal Reserve Board data
as discussed earlier. The fourth column shows the percentage
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Table 3.1 Aerospace Industry Capacity and Output
Change in Change in
Fiscal Capac it
y
Capacity from Output from
Year Util izat ion Capacity Last Year Output Last vear
1954 83.23 75.33 8.81 62.70 2.90
1955 71.67 78.00 3.54 55.90 -10.85
1956 74.98 80.93 3.76 60.68 8.55
1957 84.70 84.33 4.20 71.43 17.72
1958 75.07 85.05 0.85 63.85 -10.61
1959 70.12 84.93 -0. 14 59.55 -6.73
1960 68.82 85.00 0.08 58.50 -1 .76
1961 66.43 84.68 -0.38 56.25 -3.85
1962 72.44 82.90 -2.10 60.05 6.76
1963 81.32 81.10 -2.17 65.95 9.83
1964 82.83 84.03 3.61 69.60 5.53
1965 81.27 87.73 4.40 71.30 2.44
1966 88.26 93.98 7.12 82.95 16.34
1967 92.67 104.38 11.07 96.73 16.61
1968 89.69 113.70 8.93 101 .98 5.43
1969 86.99 116.80 2.73 101 .60 -0.37
1970 80.22 118.90 1 .80 95.38 -6.12
1971 66.69 121.00 1 .77 80.70 -15.39
1972 64.88 122.65 1 .36 79.58 -1 .39
1973 70.57 121.70 -0.77 85.88 7.92
1974 75.30 120.30 -1 .15 90.58 5.47
1975 73.15 118.90 -1.16 86.98 -3.97
1976 70.93 117.32 -1 .33 83.22 -4.32
1977 73.21 115.90 -1 .21 84.85 1 .96
1978 79.17 116.75 0.73 92.43 8.93
1979 89.26 122.03 4.52 108.93 17.85
1980 90.49 127.78 4.71 115.63 6.15
1981 83.78 133.78 4.70 112.08 -3.07
1982 73.43 139.38 4.19 102.35 -8.68
1983 68.56 143.65 3.06 98.48 -3.78
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change in capacity from the previous year, the variable whose
behavior is the focus of our attention, as described in Eq. 3.2.
Where negative numbers are reported capacity has shrunk— presumably
from obsolescence or time-related attrition or from disposal.
The last column contains the actual percentage changes in
output from the previous years. Since the purpose for now is
to determine the parameters for Eq. 3.2, we will presume that
this column could also be read as forecasted changes. Later
in the chapter we will address the issue of output forecasts .
Analysis
Figure 3.1 graphically depicts the data of Table 3.1. The
dotted line on the top represents the level of aerospace industry's
capacity. The solid line represents the level of the industry's
output. The percentage changes of each variable are captured
in the slope of the respective line for the time segment in
question. And the distance between the two lines represents
the magnitude of idle capacity for a particular time period.
Several observations can be made from a careful examination
of the plot. First, an increase in output generally led to
expansion of capacity. Second, large amount of idle capacity
generally led to shrinkage of capacity. Third, capacity increases
tended to lag behind output increases following periods of large
amounts of idle capacity, which simply meant that when the industry
has a lot of unused capacity, the idle capacity absorbed the
increase in output. All these observations are intuitively
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Fiscal Years
80 83
Figure 3.1 Aerospace Industry Capacity and Output, 1954-1983
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After several iterations of data exploration, a multiple
regression model produced the following result:
Delta(CAP t+1 ) = -26 . 89+0 . 367 [ (CU t _i+CU t ) /2 ]+0 . 21 7Del ta (0UTPUT t+ i
)
The T-ratios for the two independent variables are 8.70 and
6.05 respectively. The adjusted R2 i s 77.0%. With 25 degrees
of freedom, all of the above statistics are significant at better
than the 1% level. As anticipated, the coefficients for the
explanatory variables are positive, depicting the expected positive
association
.
This equation explains the business community's proclivity
to make capacity changes in terms of its present and recent
past state of CU , and its own anticipation of changes in output.
It gives us a means of preparing moving, dynamic forecasts of
changes in capacity, assuming we possess forecasts of output
(as well as a history of CU)
.
To assess the strength of the regression equation, we prepared
a CU forecast by using the FRB output as the input for Eq. 3.2.
The results are shown in Table 3.2. It should be noted again
that this validation method is designed to separate the quality
of Eq . 3.2 forecast from that of output forecast, which will
be the focus of our test in the next section.
It can be seen from Table 3.2 that, if reliable output forecast
is available, the CU forecasting model developed above can predict
the state of capacity utilization in the aerospace industry
with a high degree of accuracy. We now turn our attention to
forecasting aerospace industry output changes.
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Table 3.2 Forecast of CU When Output Change Is Available
Fiscal Cap acity Util Lzat ion
Year Actual Predicted Difference
1956 74.99 75.24 -0.25
1957 84.70 85.23 -0.53
1958 75.07 75.99 -0.92
1959 70.12 70.01 0.11
1960 68.82 69.10 -0.28
1961 66.43 67.93 -1 .50
1962 72.44 72.72 -0.28
1963 81 .32 79.03 2.29
1964 82.83 81 .63 1 .20
1965 81.27 81 .09 0.18
1966 88.26 88.56 -0.30
1967 92.67 95.75 -3.08
1968 89.69 93.37 -3.68
1969 86.99 86.34 0.65
1970 80.22 77.37 2.85
1971 66.69 65.58 1.11
1972 64.88 65.29 -0.41
1973 70.57 71.28 -0.71
1974 75.30 75.66 -0.36
1975 73.15 73.23 -0.08
1976 70.93 70.42 0.51
1977 73.21 71 .87 1.34
1978 79.17 77.38 1 .79
1979 89.26 87.37 1 .89
1980 90.49 88.59 1 .90
1981 83.78 81 .99 1 .79
1982 73.43 73.02 0.41
1983 68.56 69.74 -1 . 18
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FORECASTING OUTPUT CHANGES
It is undeniable that the DOD is a major source of the aerospace
industry's business. Government usually accounts for between
40% and 60% of total sales of the heavily defense-oriented industry.
Therefore, it is logical to hypothesize that the aerospace industry
output may be significantly correlated with DoD's procurement
budget. We will proceed to test this hypothesis.
Data
Table 3.3 shows the budgetary procurement data for fiscal
years 1961 through 1980. The data were compiled from three
sources: (1) Five Year Defense Plan, (2) House Appropriations,
and (3) Senate Appropriation Hearing Records. The Five Year
Defense Plans cover the years 1962-1980 and the remainder was
based on congressional sources.
Table 3.3 Funding Request for Aircraft and Missiles
(In FY72 $1,000,000)
Fiscal Year Amounts Fiscal Year Amounts
1961 5,415 1971 9,107
1962 7,189 1972 9,897
1963 7,270 1973 9,824
1964 7,052 1974 9,956
1965 6,478 1975 10,767
1966 9,148 1976 13,644
1967 9,925 1977 19,167
1968 9,843 1978 24,250
1969 9,694 1979 26,662
1970 8,528 1980 32,036
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Analysis
Since the data reported in Table 3.3 are budgetary figures,
one would expect that the figure would correlate with the aerospace
industry's output in subsequent years. The following regression
equation shows the result by using one time lag:
0UTPUT t = 66.431 + 1 , 834(BUDGET t _ 1 )
The R2 adjusted for the degree of freedom is 51.4% and the T-ratio
for the Five Year Defense Plan budget is 4.47, both are statistically
significant at the 5% level. It is interesting to note that
the coefficient of determination, which measures the percentage
variation in the dependent .variable which is explained by the
independent variable, falls within the range of government business
experienced by the aerospace industry during the past three
decades. Therefore the simple regression model performs as
well as one can expect. Table 3.4 shows the actual output level,
the predicted output level using the regression equation, and
the residuals for each period.
It should be noted that the Dur b in-Wa t s on statistic for
the above regression equation is very low (0.37), indicating
a strong autocorrelation among the residuals. This autocorrelation
may be attributed to the cyclical variation in the commercial
market
.
Using the Box-Jenkins method of time series analysis, the
residuals were analyzed with an au toregressive model with the
order of two, or ARIMA( 2 , , ) . Let us assume that the residuals
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from the regression equation is designated by E, or error, the
resulting equation is as follows:
Et = 0.0593 + 1.4145(E t _i) - 0.7505(E t -2)
The coefficients for E t _]_ and E t -2 are statistically significant
at the 5% level. Combining the simple regression equation and
the au t o r e gr e s si ve equation, we obtain an output estimation
model as follows:
0UTPUT t = 66.4803 + 1834(BUDGET t _ 1 ) + 1.4145(E t_i) - 0.7505(E t _ 2 )
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Table 3.5 shows the strength of the output prediction model,
using the Five Year Defense Plan budgetary data as the only
input. Predicted capacity utilization of the aerospace industry
shown in Table 3.5 was based on the coefficients for Eq. 3.3
discussed in the preceding section. Figure 3.2 graphically
depicts the high degree of reliability of the capacity utilization
method discussed in this chapter. The solid line represents
actual capacity utilization rate reported by the Federal Reserve
Table 3.5 Result of Output Prediction Model
Based on Output Prediction Model
Fiscal Actual Predicted Output Capacity
Year Output Output Error Change Capac it
y
Utilization
1962 60.05 62.69 -2.64 11 .43 84.79 73.94
' 1963 65.95 66.18 -0.23 5.58 86.18 76.79
1964 69.60 72.74 -3.14 9.90 88.96 81 .77
1965 71.30 75.30 -4.00 3.53 92.37 81.52
1966 82.95 74.59 8.36 -0.94 95.21 78.34
1967 96.73 95.88 0.85 28.54 101 .49 94.47
1968 101.98 100.34 1 .64 4.65 109 .70 91 .47
1969 101 .60 98.93 2.67 -1 .40 116.49 84.93
1970 95.38 95.46 -0.08 -3.51 120.88 78.97
1971 80.70 85.09 -4.39 -10.87 121.76 69.88
1972 79.58 72 .87 6.71 -14.36 118.43 61 .53
1973 85.88 80.64 5.24 10.67 116.59 69.17
1974 90.58 89.01 1 .57 10.36 117 .58 75.70
1975 86.98 92.45 -5.47 3.88 119.86 77.13
1976 83.22 84.87 -1.65 -8.20 120.51 70.43
1977 84.85 85.61 -0.76 0.88 120.26 71 . 19
1978 92.43 94.52 -2.09 10.40 122.07 77 .43
1979 108.93 102.97 5.96 8.94 126.07 81 .68
1980 115.63 119.47 -3.84 16.02 133.30 89.62
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Board. The dotted line represents our prediction described
above
.
LONG-TERM FORECAST OF CAPACITY UTILIZATION
Although using the Five Year Defense Plan budgetary data
as the basis to forecast aerospace industry output and capacity
utilization has been shown to be highly accurate, the period
for which forecasts can be made is only one period ahead of
the release of the Five Year Defense Plan. For second sourcing
decision, we must look ahead at least five years into the future.
Therefore, the use of a long term output forecast is necessary
if Eq . 3.3 is to be useful.
55 60 65 70 75 80 FY
Figure 3.2 Actual vs Predicted Capacity Utilization
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The Electronic Industries Association (EIA) sponsors the
preparation of ten-year forecasts of DoD procurements,
figures shown in Table 3.6 cover FY83-93 for aircraft , missiles
and space (which essentially defines the non-commercial segments
of the aerospace market). 1
Table 3.6 EIA Forecast of DoD Aerospace Market
Forecast Forecast
Output Change in












The Value Line Investment Survey is another source of reliable
(but shorter-term) forecasts for the performance of the aerospace
'•This information was abstracted from a conference manual, White,
L.B., Analyzing & Forecasting Aerospace Markets
,
The Technical







industry. 2 The prognosis reported in its industry analysis
dated April 20, 1984, lends cred itabil ity to the EIA forecast:
. we expect defense spending to grow throughout
the 1980s, although the annual percentage increase
will slow as the budget gets bigger and immediate
needs are met
.
Value Line expects the total aerospace market to grow at only
a 5.33% rate from (CY) 1983 to 1984, but then at an average
rate of about 8.34% from 1984 until 1988. This is attributable
to a currently weak commercial market which they expect to improve
dramatically by the mid-eighties. These different shorter-term
outlooks will provide an opportunity for sensitivity analysis.
Table 3.7 Forecasts of Aerospace Industry CU




































2Value Line, Inc., New York.
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THE PROGNOSIS
Based on the forecasts shown in Table 3.7, it appears that
conditions will be relatively favorable for dual sourcing during
most of the next decade. However, there will be a brief period
during the mid-to-late eighties during which especially alert
management of the procurement process will be necessary if net
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Figure 3.3 CU Through Time--Hist or y and Forecasts
A3
The solid line in Figure 3.3 traces actual CU from FY53
through FY83. Two forecasts are shown as extensions of that
line. The dotted line is an outlook constructed from Value
Line's expectations of aerospace industry growth. The dashed
line represents a forecast on the basis of the EIA prognosis
for DoD procurements.
Prior experience with major weapon systems has shown that
positive savings can be expected from dual sourcing when CU
lies below 80%. The zone lying below the shaded bar can therefore
be thought of as identifying time periods during which dual
sourcing is the logical choice.
Since dual sourcing should not be expected to produce savings
when CU is above about 85%, the area above the shaded bar identifies
times when sole-source procurement would be favored. These
conditions are not expected to prevail during the next decade.
The shaded bar itself can be thought of as a "caution zone."
Careful management of a procurement is necessary if positive
savings are to be experienced when CU lies within this range.
For example, if a program's capacity constraints or other factors
prevent what appears to be an optimal division of procurements
between the original supplier and the second source, it might
be preferable to plan on using sole sourcing from about FY86
through, say, FY89
. Since this may be a difficult time during
which to use dual sourcing as a cost-reducing apparatus, the
best policy might be to remain very flexible.
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EQUILIBRIA
Since the CU forecasting model discussed in the chapter
expresses the rate at which capac i t y is growing as a function
of recent CU and the growth rate anticipated for output , a constant
rate of output growth should lead to a CU equilibrium point.
This equilibrium can be determined either iteratively or
analytically .
Table 3.8 contains an array of possible growth rates and
the CU equilibrium which would be associated with each.
















It is intuitively appealing to note both that the economy
is more efficient in terms of CU when it is growing at a fairly
rapid clip and that competition would be more effective as a
price reducer during slow-downs.
However, we might make additional observations which are
more relevant to the procurement process. Dual sourcing would
not normally be useful as a cost-reducing apparatus unless the
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sustained rate of output growth was less than about three or
three-and-a-half percent. Even with exceptionally good management
it would be difficult to achieve net financial benefits when
the growth rate exceeded roughly five percent.
Value Line anticipates (real) output growth in the aerospace
industry will average 7.7% between now and the end of 1988.
The EIA expects the rate of growth in the DoD portion of the
market to decline to less than three percent by FY88, and to
continue declining through FY93.
These growth rates should not be interpreted as
sustained , so equilibrium conditions will not actually be achieved,
but the anticipated trends do lend credence to the principal
conclusion reached in the chapter. During the mid-to-late eighties
especially careful management of the procurement process will
be necessary if we are to reap net financial benefits from dual
sourcing. The best opportunities for using dual-source procurement




ANOTHER LOOK AT DUAL SOURCING EXPERIENCE
There have been many studies identifying and quantifying
the procurement cost consequences of dual sourcing. The theoretical
roots of much of this work go no more deeply than learning curve
theory. Much has been made of the "shift" and "rotation" which
seem to be apparent in the learning curve when a second source
is introduced . 1
Increasingly, production rates are being recognized as
also having an important influence on procurement costs. 2 Indeed,
production rate effects are often used as an argument against
dual sourcing . 3
Second-source start-up costs, including the costs of (1)
technology transfer, (2) special tooling, test and production
equipment, (3) educational buys and (4) administrative costs
to the Government, have also been recognized as affecting the
outcome of a dual-source procurement.^ These must be offset
*For example, see Cox, L.W. and J.S. Gansler, "Evaluating the
Impact of Quantity, Rate, and Competition," Concepts (Autumn 1981).
^Bemis, J.C., "A Model for Examining the Cost Implications of
Production Rate," Department of Defense, Product Engineering
Services Office, Defense Logistics Agency, Cameron Station,
Alexandria (undated).
^Bemis, J.C., and J.S.W. Fargher, Jr., "Model for Determining
the Effects of Production Rate Change and Dual/Second Sourcing
Decisions," (unpublished draft).
^For some interesting insights, see Myers, M.G., P.R. McClenon,
and H.M. Tayloe, "Price Competition in the DOD , " Logistics Managment
Institute, September 1982.
47
against price savings to determine the net financial benefit
derived .
It is also recognized that procurement cost savings must
be discounted to present value using an appropriate time value
of money. Failure to do so will overstate the economic advantage
available from dual sourcing.5
Finally, we wish to cite our earlier work done for NAVAIR
demonstrating that capacity utilization in the relevant industry
is an important determinant of the savings obtainable under
dual sourcing.6 It is this work upon which we seek to build.
CAPACITY UTILIZATION AND EFFECTS OF QUANTITY SPLIT
In the above-cited NAVAIR work, capacity utilization (hereafter
referred to as CU) was found to be positively correlated with
the price paid to an original-source contractor under dual-source
competition for major weapon systems. 7 That is, when CU is
high—when there is very little idle capacity in the industry
—
neither the threat nor the fact of competition is sufficiently
onerous to induce much in the way of price concessions. However,
^Archibald, K.A., et al . , "Factors affecting the Use of Competition
in Weapon System Acquisition," Rand Corp., R-2706-DR&E, February
1981.
"Greer, W.R., Jr., and S.S. Liao , "Cost Analysis for Dual Source
Weapon Procurement," Naval Postgraduate School technical report
No. 54-83-011, October 1983.
'Much of the data upon which this work was based were collected
by and for Beltramo, M.N. and D.W. Jordan, "Issues to be Considered
in Establishing Dual Source Competition," (second report) Division
of Cost Analysis (MAT-01F4) Headquarters, Naval Material Command,
24 September 1982.
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if CU is low (implying larger amounts of idle capacity in the
industry) competition can be valuable as a price-reducer.
We will model the price paid to the original source, P,
t




i = f(CU, OF)
.
(4.1)
Again, the direction of the relationship between P, an d CU has
been found to be positive.
The same relationship between CU and the price paid to
the second source can be expected if both are in the same market. 8
Therefore the same general model will be sufficient to describe
the factors influencing P~
:
p
? = f(CU, OF).
(A. 2)
Next consider the division, or splitting, of the procurement
between the original source and the second source. There are
many possible ways to measure this division. 9 For example,
either quantities or dollars could be used. Also, one could
measure the split during only the competitive phase of a program
"Our earlier study (see footnote 6) confirmed this positive relation-
ship. However, the numerical values of the coefficients are
different for the original and the second source suppliers.
^The interested reader might like to study Bell, J. P., "Competition
as an Acquisition Strategy: Impact of Competitive Research
and Development on Procurement Costs," Institute for Defense
Analysis paper No. P-1744, November 1983.
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or during the entire program. For simplicity, we will measure
the division in terms of total (real) dollars spent with each
respective source over the entire life of the procurement.
Di will represent the percentage of the total procurement dollars
captured by the original source. D
2 is the percentage the second
source receives. (Please note that D^ = 100% - D-..)
Next, we can define a weighted average procurement price
paid under dual sourcing, P , ;
P
d = (D]_ x ? x ) + (D 2 x P 2 ) (4.3)
By substitution,
P
d = [D : x f(CU, OF)] + [(100% - D l ) x f(CU, OF)]. (4.4)
If other factors (OF) are held constant, Eq. 4.4 implies that






The procurement price savings generated by dual sourcing
are conventionally determined by comparing the actual prices
paid with the prices which would have been paid under sole sourcing.
More will be said later about sole-source prices, but, for now,
simply let the sole-source price (which is assumed to be greater
than the dual-source price) be P
g f so t h e price reduction achieved




Earlier it was pointed out that establishing a second source
(after some period of procuring from only the original source)
requires the incurrence of start-up costs. Some start-up costs
undoubtedly increase with the proportion of the total quantity
to be procured from the second source. These might include (but
are not necessarily limited to) the costs of special tooling,
test and production equipment, educational buys, and perhaps
some of the administrative costs borne by the Government.
Start-up costs (SC) must be offset against the discounted
present value of the savings in procurement price to determine
the net financial benefit (NFB) from dual sourcing. In simple
equation form,
NFB = pv(P
_ p ) _ SC. (4.5)
To review the direction of the impact of changes in the
critical variables on NFB, first consider CU . From Eq. 4.4
we know P
^
rises when CU rises. Therefore, Eq. 4.5 tells us
that NFB (which we seek to maximize) declines as CU rises.
We save less when CU is high.
The other variable of interest is D, percent of procurement
dollars captured by the original source. Here the relationship
is more complex. In theory, savings result when the original
source is pressed by a second source under conditions of low
capacity utilization. This might imply that as D, declines
NFB rises, because the pressure placed upon the original source
to reduce P^ would be even greater: but diminishing returns
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must be reached at some point. 10 And raising Do causes SC to
rise, thereby reducing NFB.
The final determination of the relationship's shape, as
well as the most likely optimum point (if there is one) is therefore
complex and must be studied through empiricism. It is to this
task that we now turn.
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION
Data
The data examined in this study include weapon systems acqui-
sition histories and industry capacity utilization data. These
data have been used and described in our earlier study, but
we will briefly describe each here.
The weapon systems data describe the economic outcomes
of seven major weapon acquisition programs which were dual sourced
after an introductory period of sole-source procurement. The
savings (loss) percentages listed in Table 4.1 are those previously
reported for these programs. H
The CU data came from the Federal Reserve Board in quarterly
form. They were converted to a fiscal year basis before use.
The CU figures reported in Table 4.1 are averages for the fiscal
years during which each of the programs was dual sourced and
l°Note that if this is taken to either extreme (D^ = 100% or D2 =
100%) you are in a sole-sourcing situation again.
USee footnotes 6 and 7. Other analyses have produced similar
results. See Sherbrooke and Associates, "Quantitative Acquisition
Strategy Models," Potomac, March 1983.
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(when applicable) the first year in which a winner-take-all,
"buy-out" competition was held. 12

























The data from which D^ was derived came from the same source
as the savings (loss) data. Constant dollar costs were used




By examining Table 4.1, the reader can confirm that of the
seven programs studied, only three generated price savings (P _ p )© (1
^This is the only year in which a buy-out competition has been
found to have a siginficant impact on price. See Greer and
Liao, op . ci t
.
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with present values which were high enough to more than offset
the start-up costs (SC) required to obtain them. In other words,
in only three cases was NFB from Eq. 4.5 positive. Indeed,
the average of the savings (loss) column shows an overall average
loss of 8.8%! In each of the three "savings" cases, CU averaged
less than 80% during the competitive phase of the program.
The D^ values for most of the programs with positive NFBs fell
within a range of about 85-90%.
Further analysis can provide even richer insight. A regression
can be run on the data contained in Table 4.1. If we regress
NFB using CU and D.^ a s predictors, the result is:
NFB = 27.38 - 1.267 CU + .942 D (4.6)
The T-ratio statistics from the regression were -2.86 for CU
and 6.54 for D
^
. This yields significance at better than the
.05 level for both predictors. The R adjusted for degrees
of freedom is 93.6%--a very good "fit."
Again, we see that as CU rises NFB declines. In addition,
it is clear that, within the range of values for the quantity-split
shown in the table
,
tilting the division of the procurement
toward the original source produces greater savings. However,
this conclusion should be qualified due to serial correlation
of residuals .
The residuals from the regression model shows a moderate
degree of first order autocorrelation. Rearranging the data
in an ascending order according to the quantity-split, D^ , for
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the regression analysis results in even stronger first order
autocorrelation among residuals. Further analysis of the residual
shows that this phenomenon is caused by the nonlinearity of
the relationship between NFB and D ]_ . As discussed earlier,
when D
^ declines, NFB rises, because the pressure placed upon
the original source to reduce ?
l
would be even greater: but
diminishing returns must be reached at some point. And reducing
D i beyond certain point causes SC to rise, thereby reducing
NFB. On the other hand, if the second source receives only
a nominal amount of quantity, i.e., D]_ approaches 100%, it would
not pose as much of a threat to the original source. Therefore,
NFB would decrease as D]_ approaches the extreme points at both
ends. Unfortunately, for the limited number of observations
available for analysis, the values for D]_ cluster in the 70%
to 90% range. We were unable to determine with sufficient confidence
the shape of the curvilinear relationship and its turning point.
With this limitation in mind, let us assess the quality
of the regression model by examining the values of NFB it would
predict
,
and comparing these with the actual values. This is
done in Table 4.2. While the predictions are not perfect (other
factors are never precisely equal), a gain would always have
been predicted when in fact there was a gain
,
and a loss would
have been forecast when a loss actually occurred— and the magnitudes
are ordinally correct.
55




























So far, the analysis has verified that dual-source competition
produces greater NFBs for the Government when there is substantial
idle capacity in the relevant industry. At the average value
of D^
} 68%, a "break-even point" would occur at about CU = 72%.
It appears that, in many of the cases studied, the second
source has been called upon to play a lar ger-than-op timal role.
Greater net financial benefits have been experienced when the
second source was allotted about 10-15% of the procurement.
It seems plausible that this amount of business is sufficient
to induce the desired original-source price reductions during
periods of low CU, but not so large as to require outsized amounts
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of start-up cost. In fact, the data contained in Table 4.1
combine with Eq. 4.6 to suggest that with close control of D,
it would be possible to generate savings with CU as high as
about 85%. Unfortunately, limited observations and the distribution
of T>i do not allow us to determine the exact shape of the curvilinear
relationship and pinpoint the point of diminishing return for




CAPACITY UTILIZATION AND SOLE SOURCE ACQUISITION
Thus far the development of the literature has implicitly
assumed there to be no association between capacity utilization
(CU) and the price paid under sole source acquisition, P
While this in fact may be true, the issue bears examination
inasmuch as an accurate statement of net financial benefit (NFB)





In examining procurements that were sole sourced, we used
data for missile, fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter programs. 1
One may question the reliability of these data, which were compiled
from congressional records, as a true representation of actual
acquisition cost to the Government. For lack of better source
to collect sufficient data from a cross-section of major weapon
systems, we used them to see if a clear correlation exists between
the price paid by the Government and the CU of the aerospace
industry. One may reject the reliability of the magnitude of
a specific coefficient, but the pattern of the relationship
between the variables examined should not be denied if a consistent
and logical pattern is found.
•These data were taken from Nicholas, T.G., U.S Military Aircraft
Data Book , 6th ed., and U.S. Missile Data Book , 8th ed
.
, both
by Data Search Associates, 1984
.
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With this data caveat in mind let us discussed the programs
to be analyzed. A number of sole-sourced programs were selected
for scrutiny. Those showing no statistical significance were
eliminated from further analysis. Table 5.1 lists those that
survived this initial screening.























The following model was run for each program
P = kQ a R b CU c. (5.1)
The dependent variable, P, is the average unit price for each
lot
. The constant, k, is the intercept in the conventional
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learning curve model. The first term of this model, Q a , will
be recognized as the conventional learning curve. The independent
variable, Q, is the mid-point unit number. 2 The second term,
R b
,
is the now-familiar Bemis alteration of the learning curve
model, which includes a production rate term. 3 Following convention,
we used the annual procurement quantity as a surrogate for rate.
The final term, CU C
,
adds our capacity utilization term. CU
is defined as being for the aerospace industry as a whole.
Linear regression was used to derive parameter values for
each program (from the log form of the model), and the statistically
significant values were then averaged by category. The results
are shown in Table 5.2:
Table 5.2 Parameter Values for Sole Source Program Cost Model
Parameters
Fixed Wing (R 2 = 72.8%)
Helicopters (R 2 = 91.7%)




The a- and b-parameter values reported in Table 5.2 are
typical. Fixed wing aircraft show a 90% learning curve (a =
-.160) and missiles show 80% (a = -.327). Helicopters, with
their small-quantity, short run production, display no statistically
2The conventional formula, ((Q + l)/3) + 0.5, was used to determine
the lot "mid-point" for the first lot. See Greer and Liao,
op . cit
.
30p.p . cit .
60
significant learning curve parameter. The rate term ( b-par anet er
)
values found are in line with those found by Bemis.4 The c-parameter
holds greater interest.
It is clear from examining the "c" values in Table 5.2
that CU (as well as the more conventional terms) offers insight
which could be useful in both cost estimation and procurement
policy-making settings. That is, advance knowledge of CU would
enable procurement costs to more accurately be estimated—whether
the mode is sole _or_ dual source.
IMPLICATION FOR SOLE SOURCE ACQUISITION
The exponent values shown in Table 5.2 indicate there is
a tendency for procurement costs to fall as the aerospace industry
CU rises if a procurement is conducted in a sole-source mode.
(Note the negative exponents for the CU terms.) This tendency
probably derives from the practice of allowing a contractor
to spread his fixed costs over the smaller number of units produced
when the market is slackens and overall corporate CU is low— thus
"cost- justifying" a higher price.
There is some cause-effect similarity between price changes
induced by changes in CU and changes in production rate, R,
under sole source environment. In either case, fixed costs
attach to different quantities of output. However, in the case
of CU the quantity change is a change in overall corporate output
(as it relates to corporate overhead). A rate change (R) _bv_
40p. cit.
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itself causes only a change in the allocation of those fixed
costs which originate in the facility (or segment) which is
used for the program in question. Either of these changes can
occur independently of the other, depending on what is taking
place in the rest of the firm. The two will be identical only
if the program of interest is the only business the firm has.
However, a notable feature in Table 5.2 should be mentioned.
Note that the negative exponents for c are all much steeper
than those for b, indicating that a change in CU has a much
more profound effect on the price than the same percentage change
of R. This is probably the result of the corporate structure
in the aerospace industry, i.e., the plant in charge of a specific
weapon program is only a small segment of the whole firm. This
observation also helps explain why CU is such a strong determinant
of weapon system price, as we have discussed earlier.
Table 5.3 helps to summarize the findings thus far. Over
the last 30 years CU has in fact varied over a range of 66%
to 93%. The 30-year average has been 78%. The first column
in Table 5.3 shows various different levels of CU over this
range. The next two columns show the savings (loss) we might
expect to result from dual sourcing those missile programs examined
above (no generalization can be made to aircrafts as no historical
dual source data can be analyzed) at those levels of CU for
two different values of D
l
. 68% and 85%. Note again that savings
result from dual sourcing when CU is low; losses are experienced
when CU is high. Much better results can be expected when D-.
= 85% than when D, = 68%.
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Table 5.3 Predicted Savings (Loss) at Various Levels of CU
(Missiles
)































The final column in Table 5.3 requires elaboration. Let's
conceptualize a standard (or "normal") sole-source price as
one which could be expected at CU = 78%— the average for the
last 30 years. The figures in this column show the percentage
change in price we could expect if CU were to rise or fall to
the indicated level. For example, an increase in CU from 78%
to 85% would be expected to produce about a 10% price savings
when we refrain from dual sourcing. If CU were to fall from
78% to 70%, we could expect the price to rise by about 14% if
we continue the sole source mode. The entry in the CU = 78%
row is, obviously, zero.
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DISCUSSION
To summarize, if "standard" or "average" conditions prevail
(CU = 78%), a well-managed dual-source program could be expected
to produce small NFBs for the Government. But dual sourcing
has an unambiguous edge over sole-source procurement when CU
is very low—say 65-70%. Sole sourcing appears to be financially
preferable when CU is high--part icular ly above about 85%.
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Chapter 6
IMPLEMENTATION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis has shown that advance knowledge of aerospace
industry capacity utilization (CU) can improve the Government's
ability to plan for economical procurements of major weapon
systems. This ability is useful in both cost estimation and
procurement po 1 i c y -se 1 1 i n g . In this chapter, we will discuss
the implementation of our findings and suggest future plans
to further the understanding of weapon cost determinants.
IMPLEMENTATION OF FINDINGS
Price Changes and CU
The methodology developed in this paper points to ways of
improving the cost-estimation process for major weapon systems.
It is now possible to calculate the percentage change in price
that can be expected to result from forecast changes in the
state of CU once the procurement mode is known. For example,
if we know a fixed-wing aircraft is to be procured sole source,
and if CU is, say, 80% at the onset of procurement but is expected
to decline to 70%, we could expect the price to rise above what
it would otherwise be by
,
TO" 1 ' 062 - SO" 1 ' 062
SO" 1 ' 062
= 15.2%.
Parameter values shown in Table 5.1 may be used to estimate
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sole source price changes for other categories of weapon systems.
Cost estimation under dual sourcing is more complex in
that it requires advance knowledge of more of the conditions
surrounding the procurement . 1 In its simplest form we may use
the price prediction models developed in our earlier study. 2
For convenience, the equations are reproduced here.
For the Original Source:
...
„.
.. - p . n-0.278 PTT 1.25 -0.201M -0.854N ., 1fwith median values: P = kQ CU e e (6.1)
... . . p in-0.26 PTT 1.765 -0.201M -0.854N ,, AWith mean values: P = kQ CU e e (6.2);
For the Second Source:
„.,. ,. - D , o-0.174 -0.520NWith median values: P = kQ e (6.3)
„... -, D in -0.214 -0.520NWith mean values: P = kQ e (6.4)
"P", of course, is the average price for the buy. "k" and "Q"
are the intercept and midpoint cumulative quantity found in
the learning curve model. "CU" represents capacity utilization
while "M" and "N" are dummy variable, with M=l if the buy is
under dual sourcing and N=l if the competition is winner-take-all.
J-W. R. Greer, Jr., and S. S. Liao, "Cost Analysis for Dual Source
Weapon Procurement," Naval Postgraduate School Technical Report,
NPS54-83-011
, October 1983. (A135351)
2 Ibid., p. 4.9.
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Our current analysis found additional evidence that the
division of procurement dollars is another determinant of the
magnitude of competitive savings. But the most important result
is the development of a reliable CU forecasting method to allow
oper a t ional i
z
ing the concept of fitting the procurement mode
(dual source versus sole source) to the CU conditions which
are expected to prevail during the competitive phase of the
procurement
.
Timing of Procurement and CU
Tailoring the procurement mode to the CU conditions may
be as simple a matter as better timing. We have shown that
it is virtually impossible to generate any kind of savings by
introducing a second source supplier when the industry capacity
utilization rate is 85% or higher. On the other hand, when
CU is lower than 80%, dual sourcing presents an opportunity
for savings, and it should actively be considered.
Quantity Split and Savings
We found that the magnitude of competitive savings to be
closely related to the split of procurement dollars between
the two suppliers under dual sourcing. Two different factors
may be involved in this relationship. First, much as the CU
reflects whether there is competitive pressure in the market,
the division of procurement has an impact on the degree of compe-
titive pressure. The more of the procurement is allocated to
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the new source, the more creditable the competitive threat is.
On the other hand, tilting the quantity split to the new source
also increases the second sourcing start up cost. Therefore,
diminishing returns must be reached at some point. Unfortunately,
we have not been able to determine the exact shape in the
relationship .
An Example
To illustrate how our findings might be implemented, let's see
how they could be used to assist in the procurement planning
for AIAAM.
An SAI report was couched in terms of a 60/40 or 70/30
division for the AIAAM, with full scale development beginning
in FY85, original source production starting late in FY89 , and
the onset of competitive buys in FY94.3 Based on our analysis,
the policy planners might like to consider two alterations which
could improve the financial outcome of the program.
First, it appears the plans for the division might profitably
be revised toward keeping more of the procurement dollars with the
original source— say to 85/15 or even 90/10. Eq . 4.6 tells us this
change alone could easily make the difference between experiencing
a financial loss or a gain from dual sourcing the program.
Second, the anticipated state of CU should certainly be
considered in the planning process. Table 3.7 shows CU is expected
•^Beltramo, M.N. and D.W. Jordan, "Analysis of the Cost Implications
of Dual Source Competition for the AIAAM," Science Applications,
Inc. , 2 March 1983.
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to be relatively high during FY86-FY89 . These years are likely
to offer conditions which favor sole sourcing. Therefore, the
sole-source phase of the program, which SAI envisions starting
late in FY89 , might profitably be moved up (providing technological
factors do not diminish the desirability of such an action).
This would enable the Government to take full advantage of an
industry which will be in a position to spread its fixed costs
over large quantities of output.
On the other hand, excellent conditions for dual sourcing
will be present after FY89. We would expect sole sourcing during
this period to be relatively expensive, but that significant
financial savings could be generated by using dual-source compe-
tition. SAI assumes competition would not be introduced until
FY94. Policy makers might attempt to move this date up as well--
to use the slack conditions to full advantage.
SAI anticipates the total cost of AIAAM to exceed $350
million (FY83$), and that, "competition for the AIAAM would
be unlikely to result in overall cost savings . . . " However,
we find that if the division of procurement dollars could be
revised to an optimal level, and the dual-source procurement
mode timed to fit the CU conditions anticipated for FY90-93
(about 73%), it would be possible to expect savings on the order
of 15%. This would amount to $50,000,000.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH PLANS
The validity of our net financial benefit forecasting model,
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Eq . 4.6, is self-evident, as can be seen from Table 4.2. Such
a simple model, however, is likely to be disturbing to those
acquisition analysts who might argue that the effect of dual
source competition is much too complicated to be reduced to
a simple model. No doubt the issue of competitive savings _is_
a complicated one and there are numerous factors which may affect
the production cost of weapon systems, as mentioned in most
prior studies. One should bear in mind, however, that what
the Government pays is the price charged by the contractor ( s) ,
which consists of two elements: cost and profit. The plethora
of government regulations on contract management, the extensive
audit by DCAA
,
and the explicit rule on allowable profit give
us an unjustified aura of the precision with which cost and
profit can be measured. In reality, "true" cost is an elusive
concept—one which is virtually impossible to define, let alone
determine, even after the fact.
As shown in Figure 1.2, a contractor submits a bid bearing
in mind the risk level acceptable to the firm to achieve a given
amount of profit. A lower risk level simply means the firm's
chance of making or bettering its profit goal is improved.
No doubt there are many factors influencing production costs,
but most if not all of these factors are elements of risk analysis.
Changes in these factors are simply internalized by the contractor
and are not individually accounted for in an accounting system.
The only exception is perhaps the learning curve, which is why
a learning curve term remains in our model.
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In summary, an attempt to determine the "true" production
cost by identifying many relevant factors is unlikely if not
impossible to succeed, as we can see from prior comprehensive
studies. But if one understands the risk analysis involved
in a contractor's price determination decisions, then it is
easily realized that the major factors we identified, CU and
quantity split, actually capture most of the elements other
researchers have mentioned but have been unable to quantify.
Estimated costs probably have never been right on the mark.
Many factors can contribute to changes in production cost.
Therefore, cost estimation inevitably involves risk analysis
to a certain extent. How much risk the contractor is willing
to take depends on his assessment of the market environment.
We found that CU is an effective measure of the market environment,
albeit only as a surrogate measure. Thus, CU indirectly captures
the influence of many relevant factors.
By the same token, procurement split is a variable that
captures the effect of many factors. It is a variable that
measures whether the second source can pose as a genuine threat
to the original source. Together with CU, it reflects whether
competition exists in the market. It also reflects, to some
extent, how much start-up cost must be incurred to establish
a second source .
In view of the fact there are only a limited number of ma jor
weapon systems that have been second sourced, we feel our approach
is probably the only feasible one with which to proceed. With
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Optimal splitting of quantity under dual source procurement
has been the subject of several prior studies. 4 However, the
implication of quantity split for our model is broader than
in prior studies. In addition to the issue of optimal split,
it also affects the decision on the production level for which
the second source should be facilitized. Future studies on
quantity split should consider the question of front-end investment
as well as price .
It should be noted that further attempt to determine the
exact shape of the curvilinear relationship between quantity
split and net financial benefit will prove to be unproductive
until many more data points are available. Until then, inference
can only be made within the relevant range of the data.
Different Forms of Second Sourcing
A second source supplier may be introduced in several different
ways: Form-fit-function (F3)
t technical data package, direct
licensing, leader-follower, and contractor teaming. 5 While
^See
,
for example, J. C. Pelzer, "Proposed Allocation Technique
for a Two-contractor Procurement," Master's thesis, Air Force
Institute of Technology, May 1979.
-'See B. R. Sellers, "Second Sourcing: A Way to Enhance Production





arguments have been advanced to support different ways of intro-
ducing a second source under different conditions, no attempt
has been made to determine the financial consequence of these
forms
.
There are several issues involved in considering the different
forms of second sourcing. First of all, different ways of intro-
ducing a second source will have different start-up costs.
Furthermore, the willingness of the original source to assist
the new source, and the compensation required for such assistance,
conceivably may be related to the market environment. Last
but not least, the effectiveness of each of these forms as a
device for bringing price reduction pressure to bear on contractor
must be analyzed.
The last three forms mentioned above, direct licensing,
leader-follower and contractor teaming, all have a relative
short history. Comprehensive quantitative study probably will
not be feasible for several years. To establish the foundation
for future quantitative study, an analysis of the basis in economic
theory may be appropriate. Appendix B contains such a study
by P. M. Carrick on competitive contractor teaming.
Multi-Year Contracting and Market Environment
Although multi-year contracting has been in existence for
a long time, the multi-year contract as it is structured now
is significantly different from the level price, multi-year
option contract of the past. A significant number of major
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systems have been approved in recent years and an increasing
number of systems have been proposed. 6
It is apparent that economic conditions in the market is
the overriding factor in a multi-year contract. 7 Multi-year
contracting has a characteristics similar to winner-take-all
competition in that it narrows the supply source to a single
contractor. A significant number of multi-year contracts are
available for analysis. It should be beneficial to the Government
to analyze whether the estimated savings from such a contract
are related to the market environment in the aerospace industry,
and whether there is a similar pattern between winner-take-all
competition and multi-year contracting.
•
Degree of Subcontracting and Competitive Savings
Prior work on the costs and benefits of introducing competition
has not looked beyond the prime contractor level. For major
weapon systems, the prime contractor is often more a system
integrator than an actual manufacturer. An extensive subcontractor
network is needed to support the prime contractor.
Acquisition researchers have noted that the degree of subcon-
tracting may have an impact on potential savings when competition
is introduced. Some have argued that the lack of competition
for certain major components may reduce the savings potential




"Multi-year Contracting," seminar manual , Technical
Marketing Society of America, March 1984.
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if a second prime contractor is introduced. On the other hand,
we can argue that CU reflects the economic condition of the
industry as a whole, and it should not make any difference whether
the procurement dollar stays with the prime or flows down to
the subcontractors. With the factor of quantity split in the
model, however, the picture is less clear. Further analysis
of this issue is necessary in order to see whether the impact
of subcontracting on competitive savings is captured in CU.
Cost Growth and Economic Environment
The widely recognized "buy-in" practice by contractors inevitably
results in cost growth or in a reduction in the rate of cost
decrease. 8 The relationship between the size of investment
by the firm to "buy" into a development contract and the magnitude
of subsequent cost growth has been neglected by acquisition
researchers. For acquisition planners, a more important issue
is the identification of factors that may be used to predict
future cost growth. It is conceivable that the economic condition
of the industry plays an important role in the "buy-in" and
cost growth behavior. If this is the case, then CU may well
be an effective variable for forecasting purposes.
CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis has shown that advance knowledge of the aerospace
°E. Dews, G. K. Smith, A. Barbour, E. Harris, and M. Hesse,
"Acquisition Policy Effectiveness: Department of Defense Experience
in the 1970s," The Rand Corporation, R-2516-DR&E, October 1979.
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industry's capacity utilization can improve the Government's
ability to plan for economical procurements of major weapon
systems. This ability is useful in both cost estimation and
procurement policy-setting.
The cost savings which result from dual sourcing are a
function of CU and the division of the procurement between the
original supplier and the second source. As CU rises the amount
of the savings declines.
The best results have been achieved when the division is
such that the second source is called upon to supply no more
than about 10-15% of the procurement: that is, when the division
of dollars to the original source, D^ ± s ± n a range of 85-90%.
The percentage net financial benefit (NFB) from dual sourcing
can be predicted with the following equation:
NFB = 27.38 - 1.267 CU + .942 D^
Historically, dual sourcing has generated positive NFBs only
when CU has been below about 80%. But savings should be obtainable
when CU is as high as 85% with proper control of D,
When procurements are conducted under sole sourcing the
direction of the impact of CU movement on prices is just the
opposite. A parametric pricing model for missiles which includes
a CU term in addition to the conventional quantity (Q) and production
rate (R) terms was derived:
P = k Q-- 327 R--339 CU" 1 ' 205
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This model should enable the use of CU forecasts to assist in
the refinement of cost estimates when a procurement is to be
conducted using sole sourcing.
Finally, we turned to the task of building a model for
projecting aerospace industry CU as a function of the recent
state of capacity utilization and expected changes in output.
The model is
:
Delta (CAP t+1 ) = -26 . 89+0 . 367 [ (CU t _i+CU t ) /2 ]+0 . 21 7Del ta (0UTPUT t+1 )
This is a dynamic model which expresses the percentage change
in capacity (CAP) for the next FY (t+1) as 'a function of the
present and recent past state of CU and the percentage change
in output (OUT) expected for next year. This model proves to
be a reliable, accurate forecasting model.
Actual forecasts for the aerospace industry's CU for the
next decade were given in Table 3.7. The two columns contain
forecasts based on output change projections for (1) DoD procurements
(source, EIA), and (2) total output (Value Line projections
through 1988, then EIA).
Based on the forecasts shown in Table 3.7, it appears that
conditions will be relatively favorable for dual sourcing during
most of the next decade. However, there will be a brief period
during the mid-to-late eighties during which especially alert
management of the procurement process will be necessary if net
financial benefits are to be expected.
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APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL DUAL-SOURCE COMPETITION DATA
The seven programs examined in our studies represent 87
buys, of which 39 were awarded competitively. However, the
limited number of programs available for empirical study obviously
led some people to have doubts about the precision and reliability
of the dual-source savings models. In this section, we examine
additional programs for suitability for inclusion in future
studies dealing with dual-source competition.
OVERVIEW OF POTENTIAL PROGRAMS
There are appro,ximately 30 competitively procured systems
that were studied in the 1970's. However, the majority of these
systems were low complexity items competed under open advertising
or did not in fact end up in a competitive environment. A short
discussion of a few typical examples will show why most of these
programs are unsuitable for further study. 1
FAAR
The Forward Area Alerting Radar System (FAAR) was developed
by Sanders Associates, Inc. The developer was awarded the sole
source production contract until an open competition was held.
iFor program histories and cost data see E. T. Lovett and M. G.
Norton, "Determining and Forecasting Savings from Competing
Previously Sole Source/Noncompeti ti ve Contracts," Army Procurement
Research Office, APRO 709-3, October 1978.
At that time offers were received from four bidders and the
Sperry Rand Corporation was awarded the contract. One can easily
see that this was not a typical dual source competition.
AN/PRC-77 Radio Set
This system has a long and complicated production history.
RCA Corporation, the developer, was awarded two sole source
production contracts. An invitation for bids resulted in Electro-
space Corporation receiving the next contract, which was multi-year.
Lengthy delays in delivery resulted in an additional contract
to Hamilton Watch Company two years later. Hamilton, however,
failed to deliver a single item. E-Systems, Inc., was substituted
as the contractor. Subsequent contracts were no less complicated
and a complete run-down of the history is unnecessary. Suffice
it to say that no dual source competition environment 'has ever
existed during the long history of the program.
AN/ARC-131 Radio Set
Magnavox developed the system at their own expense and was
awarded three sole-source production contracts. DEI Industries
won the next contract on a competitive bid, but failed to deliver
a single item. The default dictated a return to sole source
procurement with Magnavox. Therefore, no actual competition
ever took place.
AN/UPM-98 Radar Test Set
This system has a production history somewhat similar to
79
that of the AN/ARC-131 Radio Set. Admiral Corporation, the
developer, was awarded the first production contract on a sole
source basis. A second contractor won the next contract on a
competitive bid, but failed to deliver any item. A third contractor
won the next contract, but again failed to deliver. The last
contract was awarded competitively to the original developer.
PP-4763/GRC Power Supply
The production history, again, was virtually identical to
that of the AN/ARC-131 Radio Set. Christie Corporation was
awarded the first production contract on a sole source basis.
DEI Industries won the next contract on a competitive bid but
failed to deliver a single item. A third contractor was awarded
the next contract under invitation for bid, again there was
a failure to' deliver a single item. Urgent requirements necessitated
a return to sole source procurement from Christie.
Summary Remarks
The programs discussed above are just a few examples of
failed attempts to develop a second source. Undoubtedly there
must be an unknown amount of investment associated with each
failed attempt. These investments are similar in nature to
the cost of hitting a "dry hole" in the oil drilling industry.
Although the odds of successful attempt are probably better
in second sourcing decisions, the costs of "dry holes" are never-
theless unavoidable and must be spread among the successful
ones. From the standpoint of acquisition policy, most studies
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have probably overstated the benefit of competition in major
systems acquisition for failing to consider these costs.
SUITABLE ADDITIONAL PROGRAMS
We were however, able to identify several additional programs
that do appear to be suitable for inclusion in future studies
of dual source competition procurement. A validation check
was performed for each of the additional programs. None of
result would contradicts our basic conclusion that the aerospace
industry capacity utilization (CU) is a strong determinant of
dual-source competition savings.
Walleye Missiles
While not strictly an example of dual sourcing (there was
never a period during which actual competitive split buys were
conducted), 2 the Walleye Missile does tend to confirm the reliability
of Eq. 4.6. Disregard the small quantity of Walleyes produced
by NAFI. Treat Martin (the second producer) as the "original
source" and Hughes as the "second source." There was a "transition"
during, FY67-68. Treat this as "competition."
CU was 91.2% during the transition; D was 84.8%. Eq . 4.6
predicts NFB = (8.3%). Tecolote places the actual NFB for the
program at (21. 4%). 3 The unusually large loss is probably attri-
2 A report by A.J. Kluge and R.R. Liebermann, "Analysis of Competitive
Procurements," TM-93, Tecolote Research, Inc., August 1978,
was the source of our information on this program. In their
comments the authors note that, "some suggest that it [the Walleye
I] was not a competitive award [program] in the normal sense."
3 Ibid .
, p. 2.
butable to the brevity of the "competition," or the lack of
it, as some observers have suggested. Table A.l presents the
cost summary
.
Table A.l Walleye Missile Cost Summary
FY Contractor Quantity Unit Price (FY72 $)
64 NAFI 30 51,597
65 NAFI 134 44,194
66 Martin 50 28,814
66 Martin 766 15,872
66 Martin 1 ,413 9,073
67 Martin 6 ,000 7,000
68 Hughes 20 24,830
69 Hughes 57 21 ,246
70 Hughes 148 20,789
70 Hughes 159 22,942
71 Hughes 561 22,035
Dragon Missile
McDonnell Douglas, the system developer, was awarded the
first production contract on a sole source basis. The system
was then divided into two parts for separate competitions.
Raytheon was selected as the second source for Dragon Round
and was awarded an education buy in FY72. Kollsman Instrument
was the second source for Dragon Tracker and was awarded a small
educational quantity in FY73. 60/40 split competition was conducted
in FY75 (with option for FY76) and McDonnell won both competitions.
However, both second sources won the subsequent buy-out competitions
in FY7T and FY77 .
Part of our data for Dragon Missile is from classified sources,
therefore, no cost summary will be provided here. CU for FY75-77
averages 72.43%. D
]_ is 48.8% for Dragon round and 44.2% for
tracker. Eq. 4.6 predicts net losses from dual sourcing to
be (18.4%) for the round and (22.73%) for the tracker. The
Army researchers estimated that dual sourcing resulted in a
2.7% savings (assuming 85% learning curve) for the round and
12% savings (assuming 85% curve) or (8.5%) losses (assuming
83% curve). However, examining the original data would show
that Eq . 4.6 estimates should be closer to reality. The Army
researchers used the first 0.5% of the procurement quantity
to estimate what the remaining 99.5% of quantity would have
cost under sole source. In reality, well over 10% of total
quantity was procured during the sole source phase, and the
learning curve for the 14 lots of round and 4 lots of tracker
clearly reflect an 80% curve for the round and better than 80%
curve for the tracker. If one revises the assumed learning
curves to reflect the actual contract prices, Eq . 4.6 estimates
would have been very close to the mark.
Standard Missile
The Standard Missile is not exactly suitable for inclusion
in a dual source study because no dual source characteristics
are present in the program. General Dynamics developed the
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system and was was awarded a sole source contract. GD subsequently
won a competitive buy contract and also supplied the system
on an option contract. Therefore, the system was never actually
produced by anyone other than GD . Since the data were relatively
clean and the program did have one actual competitive contract,
relevant data are shown here to facilitate future research.
Table A. 2 Standard Missile Cost Summar y
FY Contract Type Q uant it
y
Unit Price (F Y72 $)
65 Directed buy 100 173,439
67 Directed buy 860 75,230
67 - Competitive l ,087 63,522
67 Add-on 900 53,559
67 Add-on 900 50,652
67 Add-on 479 46,481
67 Add-on 900 46,290
67 Add-on 701 32,205
Note that the Eq. 4.6 estimation model would not be appropriate
for the Standard Missile because D
^ is 100%, and lies outside
the relevant range. As discussed in Chapter 4, we could not
confidently determine the exact shape of the curvilinear relationship
between NFB and D]_
. Using Eq. 4.6 to estimate Standard Missile's
competitive savings would have overstated the amount. (CU =
92.7%, D]_ = 100%, NFB = 4.1%; Tecolote places the actual NFB
for the program at -3.9%)^
4 Ibid, p. 14.
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Sidewinder AIM-9B
Table A. 3 shows the quantities and prices of Sidewinder
AIM-9B for the two contractors. Although the production history
is long, there were only two competitive buys, probably because
Philco-Ford was involved in the development of 9D/G configuration,


















































CU averages 79.9% during the split-buy periods and D]^ was
45.2%. Eq. 4.6 predicts NFB = -31.3%. Tecolote places the
actual NFB for the program at -4.1%. 5
5 Ibid., p. 36.
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The Airborne Self -Pro tect ion Jammer (ASPJ) is a half-million
dollar electronic countermeasures (ECM) package that will be
installed on the F-16, F-18, A-6 , AV-8B , F-14, and F-lll aircrafts.
Its purpose is to counter enemy missiles' terminal guidance
by either deception or noise jamming. The ASPJ program was
initiated in 1975. A distinctive, acquisition strategy, competitive
contractor teaming, was adopted with the award of concept definition
contracts to three industrial teams in 1979. An $81 million
full-scale development FPI contract was awarded to the West inghouse-
ITT team in late 1981. Delivery of the first production article
is still scheduled for 1986, even though a significant over-run
and schedule revision has had to be made.
This paper considers two questions: Does the acquisition
strategy fit the product? Secondly, is the acquisition strategy
an efficient one? It is concluded that the competitive contractor
teaming acquisition strategy is not consonant with the technical
characteristics of the product and that it is inefficient to
maintain two contractors through the production phase. Moreover,
significant savings may be attainable by having a buy-out competition
for the entire production run.
The discussion will begin with a history of the ASPJ acquisition
program. This will be relatively brief since an extensive history
of the reasons for the choice of the ASPJ acquisition strategy
already exists. 1 There are also ample summaries of the program's
history in the trade press.
2
THE ASPJ ACQUISITION STRATEGY
The standard DoD acquisition plan is structured around the
review milestones called for in DoDD5000.1 and DoDD5000.2.
The early phases consist of an initial concept definition phase
followed by advanced development. These phases are usually
conducted at very low cost to DoD, although the decisions made
at this time can result in the commitment of billions of future
expenditures. They are followed by full-scale development and,
finally, a production phase. Both of these phases, and especially
the latter, are usually quite costly.
The standard DoD acquisition strategy is to encourage extensive
competition in the early program phases and to then rapidly
narrow down the number of competitors for full-scale development
and production to a single firm. A second source may be brought
in subsequently in the production phase but this is not typical .
Defense contractors respond to this buying strategy by forming
lj
. Ruppert and S. Starrett, "An Evaluation of the Competitive




November 2, 1981; Defense Electronics
,
November
1983; and January 1984; Jane's Weapon Systems, 1983-84 , Janes
Publishing Co., 1984; Aviation Week
,
April 2, 1984; Armed Forces
International
,
March 1984, p. 52.
teams of independent contractors. The capability of each team's
members are complementary in nature so that the teams' strengths
must be assessed collectively. A team's members expect to be
participants throughout the rest of the acquisition process.
For example, the USAF has recently initiated a concept definition
competition for a next generation tactical fighter aircraft
ECM system, the Integrated Electronic Warfare System (INEWS).
Six teams have entered bids. Three teams will be selected for
the advanced development phase. Only one team will be selected
for the later phases. 3
The ASPJ program had its origin in the early 70 ' s . Both the
Air Force and the Navy had been encouraging the development of
radar warning receivers and radar and IR jamming equipment for
their aircraft. The ASPJ is not the first, but is the most
advanced, ECM equipment to integrate the radar warning receiver
and the jamming equipment into a single unit. Similar ECM equipment
is produced by the Loral Corporation and Sanders Associates, Inc.
In 1975 OSD directed the Navy and Air Force to combine their
tactical fighter ECM development programs. A joint service
program office was established in 1977 with lead responsibility
given to the Navy. The program office formulated a distinctive
acquisition strategy: the use of competitive (as opposed to
complementary) contractor teams. Each member of a team was
^Armed Forces International
,
March 1984, p. 52; Aviation Week
,
April 16, 1984, p. 120.
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to be capable of coordinating the design and producing the ASPJ.4
By february 1979 three teams were selected for an abbreviated
concept definition competition. The three teams consisted of
West inghouse/ITT ; Sanders Associates/Northr up ; and Loral/Eaton-AIL
.
In August 1979 the first two teams were selected to compete
further in the advanced development phase. A winning team was
selected in August 1981 when a full-scale development contract
was awarded to the Wes tinghouse/ITT team.
ITT and Westinghouse took a legal step of forming a joint
venture contract. A building was set aside at ITT's Nutley,
New Jersey, facility for the use of the two contractors' ASPJ
design team. The two design groups arrived at a rough initial
allocation of the total design effort after first mutually laying
out the design goals for important system performance parameters.
Essentially, each company assumed sole responsibility for. a
receiver and transmitter and shared the design of a common central
processor. Some reallocations of design responsibilities were














given for the adoption of this acquisition strategy
cess capacity existed among ECM suppliers. To be
desirable for the government as the sole buyer of
d service to stabilize its purchases and not induce
erturbations in suppliers' employment and facility
,
modernization and expansion. But by hindsignt,
is was a poor reason for adoption of the acquisition
The ECM business area has been expanding at an 43%
since 1975 ( Aviation Week , March 12, 1984, p. 215).
cult to believe that sufficient industrial capacity
xists to handle efficiently such a large expansion





One of the major constraints on the ASPJ design has been
to comply with the form and the 2.3 feet space constraints imposed
by the internal rack space allotted on the F-18 aircraft. The
F-18, in common with the F-16, had space allotted for ECM equipment
based upon the requirements of the AN/ALQ-126 ECM equipment
designed by Sanders Associates. The team's initial design did
not satisfy this constraint. Although the achieved space and
form configuration exceeded the required value by less than
3%, this resulted in excessive heat built-up and power requirement,
necessitating a redesign and repackaging effort. The effect
has been to delay completion of full-scale development and cause
a contract over-run. Instead of an $80 million FSD effort it
is now an estimated $138 million. Because the contractor team
agreed to a fixed price incentive (FPI) contract for performance
of the FSD, the contractors will receive a "negative fee", i.e.,
they will invest company funds of around $18 million.
By means of a reduction in the number of contractually deli-
verable prototypes and an abbreviation of the test program,
schedule slippage has been minimized. The initial design-to-unit
production cost (DTUPC) target remains at $400,000 per unit
(in '79 dollars). Surprisingly, the DTUPC has not been reported
to be a significant constraint on the ASP J ' s design. The DTUPC
for the ECM equipment for the Bl-B bomber is $20 million. 6
DOES THE ACQUISITION STRATEGY FIT THE PROJECT?
The unique feature of the ASPJ's acquisition strategy is
6 Aviation week
, March 12, 1984, p. 215.
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the use of competitive contractor teaming. The additional cost,
if any , of supporting a cooperative full-scale development effort
by ITT and Westinghouse has been incurred by DoD to assure the
existence of two qualified producers at the time of the initial
production order. This is in sharp contrast to any alternative
strategy for assuring a second production source. Compared
to a leader-follower or competition via technical data package,
competitive contractor teaming eliminates reliance upon a sole
production source for about a three-year period — the time
needed from the initiation of a sole source's production to
complete operational testing, validate a technical data package
(or train a second source's personnel), select and facilitate
the second source and qualify its output.
Other things being equal, competitive contractor teaming
seems to constitute the superior method of introducing a second
source. A qualified second source is available for the entire
production run, avoiding about three years of sole source production,
for what must be a comparatively nominal cost of supporting
two design production planning groups during full scale development.
However, in the case of the ASPJ, one of the alternative methods
for introducing a second source would have been preferable.
In fact, the ASPJ acquisition should probably have been conducted
as a sole source program. The reasons for these conclusions
have to do with the technical characteristics of an airborne
ECM system. In essence, it will be argued that competitive
contractor teaming is a superior acquisition strategy, but for
some more technically stable product.
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It is desirable to first recall some of the elementary technical
considerations involved in designing an airborne ECM system.
Since an airborne ECM system is designed to interfere with the
terminal guidance of an enemy's missiles, it is necessary to
first consider how a missile is guided to a target. It is apparent,
though often overlooked, that all modern anti-aircraft or anti-
missile systems utilize the search and tracking capabilities
of radar. This has heavily influenced the design of virtually
all pertinent weapon systems. Target location information acquired
by radar is a necessary component for any target destruct system
that is intended to intercept the target at a range longer than
1 miles. Target tracking is very much enhanced if the tracking
radar during the terminal phase of flight operates at very high
frequencies. But high frequency radars are intrinsically restricted
to short ranges. The development of infra-red imaging passive
receptors and very high frequency radars, plus the micro-mini-
a t ur ar i za t i o n of electronic circuitry have allowed designers
to incorporate two or more guidance systems into a missile.
The missile is quided from its launch point by a command guidance
radar located at the launch point. Then at some point in the
missile's trajectory, guidance is handed-off to a self-contained
terminal guidance system aboard the missile.
A good example of how a missile may be guided to a target
is the guidance doctrine for the new advanced medium range air-
to-air missile (AMRAAM), the AIR-120.7 It will replace the
'The information regarding the AMRAAM was obtained from NATO '
s
16 Nations
, 28, December 1983-January 1984, pp. 68-70.
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Sparrow missile, in use by both the Air Force and the Navy.
First, the aircraft radar detects a target. An on-board computer
calculates a minimum energy intercept missile flight trajectory.
This is translated into flight instructions and fed into the
missile's computer memory. After launch, the missile's flight
path is controlled by its guidance package. However, the aircraft's
pilot can update the target's coordinates via a data link with
the missile. In other words, the aircraft need not continue
to illuminate the target with its radar after launching the
missile. At some point in the missile's flight path there is
a shift over to the missile's guidance system. A so-called
semi-active radar aboard the missile provides the necessary
information for the terminal guidance to the target. A number
of choices are possible at this point. The missile's radar
seeker can use either a high pulse repetition frequency or a
medium pulse repetition rate. The missile may also turn off
its radar and home on a jamming radar signal from the target.
The missile can also be launched from an aircraft by visual
information only. In total, there are some 27 operating modes
available from which the pilot may select.
The AIRM-120's radar, in common with most tracking radars,
can operate over a fairly wide range of frequencies, at different
power levels and may use differing pulse frequencies and pulse
widths. An airborne radar will use both pulse and doppler signals
so the resulting wave form may be exceedingly complex. For
example, the missile may use a monopulse semi-active radar seeker
with a digital signal processor, as is the case with the newest
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Sparrow missile ( AIM/RIM-7M) .8
The point of this very brief discourse on missile guidance
and the role of varying radar transmission frequencies is to
pose the problem that an ECM designer confronts. Given some
appreciation of these complexities it is then possible to establish
bounds on the manner in which the enemy chooses to employ radar
in locating an airborne target and establishing and maintaining
a target intercept trajectory. The ECM designer has a large
number of options open to him, none of which can be a perfect
counter or can be used in isolation. The ease with which a
search radar acquires information can be reduced by mechanically
reducing the reflectivity of the target. The designer can attempt
to mask the target by emitting sufficiently powerful electromagnetic
energy from the vicinity of the target' to obliterate a reflected
signal. But such noise jamming requires a source of sufficient
power plus a transmitter and waveguide that will have to be
comparatively large to be capable of jamming most enemy radar
equipments. Alternatively, the designer may choose to resort
to deception jamming; upon discovering that an enemy radar is
illuminating the aircraft, the character of the transmission
is determined and the reflected signal is modified by transmitting
a distorted wave form. But this requires a very sensitive receiver,
a means of identifying the location and type of radar transmitter
as well as the wave form and signal coding system, a means of
computing the efficient means of distorting the reflected signal
"This information is contained in a Raytheon advertisement in
Armed Forces International
,
March 1984, p. 20.
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and, of course, a transmitter capable of emitting the required
wave form.
There obviously exists quite complex inter dependencies between
a radar system's design and an ECM system's design. From the
radar designer's standpoint, he should want to choose the radar's
carrier frequencies and signal forms so as to reduce vulnerability
to ECM. But the ECM designer, given enough information about
an opponent's radar and missile guidance doctrine, should be
able to design an ECM system that can substantially reduce an
elaborate system of coding pulses, so that he can detect and
reject deception jamming attempts. The ECM designer must develop
sufficiently elaborate computer software to discover the coding
sy stem .
9
Several conclusions can be drawn from this discussion.
First, since the ECM equipment requires an appreciation of the
design of the opponent's radar, the same kind of technical skills
are required for both equipments. a company might specialize
in designing and manufacturing only ECM equipment but it probably
would not be fully utilizing the capabilities of its skilled
engineers to do so. The same kinds of technical skills are
required to design a radar's components. Thus, the more viable
competitors for ECM systems should also be in the business of
designing and manufacturing radars. This inference is consistent
with the business practices of Westinghouse , Hughes Aircraft,
^The technical possibilities that the two designers face are
more complicated than stated. Two excellent sources of pertinent
information are: Robert J. Schlesinger, Principles of Electronic
Warfare
, Peninsula Publishers, 1961; J. A. Boyd, et al., Electronic
Countermeasures
, University of Michigan, 1961.
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ITT, and Raytheon. However, the inference is not consistent,
for example, with the business base of the Loral Corporation,
for which 90% of its business is ECM systems or components , 10
or Sanders Associates, which also specializes predominantly
in ECM systems. Of course, there are companies that design
and manufacture radars that are not active participants in the
ECM military market. These companies include General Electric,
RCA, Bell Labs, and Ford Aerospace.
The important point is that the size of the industry for
supplying ECM equipment is as large as the number of suppliers
of radars. Engineering talent should be able to move from a
radar design to an ECM design quite easily. In fact, this is
precisely the assumption underlying the engineering organization
of both Westinghouse and ITT. Both companies maintain a matrix
organization in which engineers specialize by component - receivers,
transmitters, traveling wave tubes, etc. Personnel are drawn
from each group for whatever business happens to be in-house.
This points out the significance of a multi-product business
base, or the economies of scope, in defining the relevant members
of an industry . 1
1
A second conclusion from the technical considerations is
that an ECM design should never be considered finished. On




-^The economies of scope is a term that has recently been coined
to explain the economic basis for mu 1 t i -p r od uc t firms. See
W. J. Baumol , J. Panzar and R. Willig, Contestable Market and
the Theory of Industry Structure , Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
Inc., 1982, pp. 248-56.
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be extraordinarily sensitive over a wide frequency range. The
received signal must be processed for identification and then
followed by the selection of a correct response to be transmitted,
i.e., a deception or jamming transmission. But once the designer
of the radar knows his systems is vulnerable to jamming he can
make a number of possible fixes. For example, he can change
the signal coding system without excessive component redesign.
But this means that the ECM signal processor will have to be
programmed to recognize a different coding system. Thus, at
least some of the original ECM equipment designers should be
retained over the operating life of the ECM system for possible
redesign contingencies. Of course, it is to be expected that
a radar designer will not wait for the ECM designers to catch
up, but will develop a reservoir of anti-ECM design modifications
for future use. 12
The ECM equipment designer confronts much more severe technical
demands than does the typical radar designer. Space and power
restrictions may negate an effective solution. The ECM receiver's
performance must be much more sensitive and cover a much wider
frequency range than a radar receiver. The ECM transmitter
must be tunable to an assortment of wave forms while a radar
transmitter can be designed for single operating mode. The
ECM equipment requires far greater computational capability
l^For a portrayal of just how effective ECM strategies can be,
see "Syrian-Israeli C3l; The Wests' Third Front?", Armed Forces
International
,
March 1984. The author also makes the point
that the Israeli's disclosure of their ECM capability has induced
changes to all Warsaw Pact radars, thus forcing the United States
to develop a new generation of ECM tactics.
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and programmable memory than a radar must have. As with any
equipment that reflects such severe technical demands many components
or assemblies will have to incorporate unproven state of the
art advances. As in designing calibration equipment for use
with test equipments, measurement accuracy requirements dictate
the use of equipment that will function acceptably only in the
controlled conditions of a test laboratory and will perform
poorly in the field until they have undergone extensive redesign. 13
Two inferences can be drawn from these technical considerations.
First, an initial ECM design may work acceptably and even pass
its operational tests, but the equipment will require a long
sequence of engineering changes and modifications as field experience
accrues. It is to be expected that production will be subjected
to frequent interruptions and costly retrofits, especially during
the first few years. But even if the equipment performs reliably
in the field, performance deficiencies or technical improvements
developed elsewhere will impose demands for periodic redesign and
modifications. This means that a permanent continuous relation-
ship must be established with the equipment's original design team.
Thus, dual sourcing for the production of ECM equipment
appear to present some cumbersome management problems. Engineering
change proposals and orders will very likely be at a high level.
Field reliability, equipment servicing and availability will
probable pose severe problems, at least during the first few
-^A good example of this extreme measuring accuracy is the Bragg
Cell device for determining the frequency of received signals,
which is under development by the Teledyne-Mec company. See
the Teledyne Annual Report for 1983 for a lucid discussion of
the design and fabrication difficulties.
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years the ASPJ is operational. It will be difficult to define
a configuration on which the two firms can compete effectively.
It is likely there will be an acute contractor incentive problem
resented by ECPs. It is desirable to encourage redesign and
circuit or component modifications as operational experience
with the ASPJ is gained. If the two suppliers are in competition
it will be difficult to coordinate their engineering efforts,
not to mention the issues of resolving conflicting redesign
solutions or establishing and pricing out a common configuration
which the competitors will then produce.
To be sure, all weapon 'systems undergo extensive design
changes as a result of production and field experience. These
continue for an extraordinarily long time. For example, the
writer found in an earlier study that even in the 18th year
of production of the Army's M113 (Armored Personnel carrier,
built by FMC Corporation), there were still 15 ECPs scheduled
for adoption in that year. Competition is most appropriate
when the product can be procured by form-fit-function performance
specifications. Then, the competing suppliers' product can
be allowed to differ physically and become another attribute
of the competition. It is very unlikely that ECPs for the ASPJ
cab ever be handled so cavalierly.
IS A COMPETITIVE CONTRACTOR TEAMING ACQUISITION STRATEGY EFFICIENT?
The argument to be developed in this section is independent
of the concerns in the previous section, for purposes of discussion,
it will be assumed that any acquisition strategy is appropriate
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for the procurement of any product. This section will compare
the efficiency obtainable from a competitive contractor teaming
acquisition strategy to that obtainable from more traditional
practices. It will be shown that not only is the traditional
sole production source acquisition strategy just as efficient,
conceptually, as the competitive contractor teaming strategy
but it may usually be more efficient.
What is the traditional acquisition strategy? It can be
defined by a process of elimination. There are countlessly
some major defense acquisition programs that have been sole
sourced from their conception. The aircraft projects at Lockheed's
"Skunk Works" probably fall into this category. Then again,
there are some in-house product developments, such as the Army's
M198 155mm howitzer, which are conceived, designed and produced
entirely in-house; There are also numerous alleged cases where
it is believed that a competition is "wired" for a specific
firm, so that the routine of soliciting competitive bids is
only a formality. Of course, every defense supplier endeavors,
or should at lest establish this kind of relationship with the
defense buying agency. 14 But all these instances of defense
acquisition strategies are the exception. The preponderance
of acquisition involve the use of competitive procurement at
least once in a program's history. Competition may only be
used at the Concept definition phase. More frequently, competition
is also used at the advanced development phase with all subsequent
^Instructions on how to achieve this goal are developed at length





procurement sole source. In fact, reliance upon competition
only at an early phase or phases, of an acquisition program
can be regarded as the traditional method of defense acquisition.
A good illustration of the traditional defense acquisition
strategy is the air force's acquisition of AMRAAM. The concept
definition phase of the AMRAAM program dates from 1977, but
probably could be pushed back to the decision to not continue
to update the Sparrow missile and design an entirely new missile.
In any case, in early 1979 two contractors, Hughes Aircraft
and Raytheon, were selected for advanced development contracts
from among five contestants. In december 1981, Hughes was announced
the winner of the competition, after a competitive shoot-out
of the two companies prototypes. Hughes was awarded a $421
million FPI contract for a 50-month full-scale development effort .
Further, as part of its bid, Hughes also had to enter FPI contracts
for the first two production options. Lot I is for the production
of 204 missiles at a target price of $212 million. Lot II is
for 720 missiles at a target price of $408 million. 15
It is to be expected that the Air Force obtained a very
competitive price for the full-scale development and production
contracts. The companies bids were solicited competitively
and the buyer controlled the terms and flows of information
to the bidders. In the absence of collusion between the bidders
or an excessively restrictive bid solicitation, each firm had
to be motivated to reveal the least amount of money it would
l^The details of the AMRAAM competition are given in NATO ' s 16
Nations
,
December 1983-january 1984, pp. 68-70.
102
be willing to accept rather than lose the business opportunity.
It is unlikely that Hughes Aircraft will realize any significant
profit until after the company negotiates later sole source
production lots. Of course, even the opportunities for a large
profit at that time are relatively well eliminated by the "Truth
in Negotiations" clauses in the Defense Acquisition Regulations.
Raytheon has already been named as a second production source,
although the date and the means of coordinating the company's
entry into production have not been announced as yet.
It should be emphasized that during the course of the advanced
development competition, Hughes and Raytheon are reported to
have, collectively, spent over $100 million of company funds. 16
This is over and above the amounts awarded the companies under
Air force contracts. Thus, the winning contractor will not
have an opportunity to possibly profit from his sole source
production status until after 1988. some 13 years will have
elapsed from the time Hughes Aircraft initially committed company
resources to the AMRAAM program until it is able to exercise
its sole source position.
It is altogether likely that Hughes Aircraft, as well as
the losing firm, consciously underbid the FSD and first two
production contracts as a means of remaining competitive. A
quite recent, and non-DoD, example of this practice is the
acknowledged buy-in by the Hazeltine Corporation of a Federal
Aviation Agency contract for development and production of a
'•"The dollar amoung is mentioned in various issues of Aviation
Week during the Fall and Winter of 1981.
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microwave landing system. The company's management has publicly
stated that the contract which covers production for a five-year
period starting in 1985, was bid at a loss of over $1.25 per
share of company stock to attain a preferential market position
for future business. 17
The ASPJ program's acquisition structure encouraged similar
behavior: the Wes t i
n
ghouse / ITT team consciously bid the ASPJ
FSD contract at a price too low to cover their expected costs.
In addition, the companies management decided to enhance their
probability of winning the FSD contract by offering a cost-sharing
arrangement as part of the basic FPI contract. The two companies
has already made a significant investment of company funds during
the advanced development competitive phase. 18 Since the value
of the ASPJ production will probably be in excess of $2 billion,
it can be surmised that both Westinghouse and ITT have already
invested between $50 million and $100 million of company funds
on enhancement of the ASPJ development effort. Both companies
must still make an investment in production facilities before
any profits from the ASPJ program will be realized.
l^ Wall Street Journal
,
January 16, 1984.
^°The contractor representative were reluctant to mention any
specific dollar investment figure for the companies' subsidy
to the competition. It was acknowledged that such an investment
decision was made by company management before the start of
the competition. Further, it was pointed out that such an investment
was an expected practice among today's defense contractors.
In other design competitions the writer has investigated, the
competitors have invested company funds ranging from 5% to 10%
of the contract value. These investments are over and above
a company's Independent Research and Development or Proposal
and Bidding expenditures, which are reimburseable
,
up to some
maximum authorized amount, as part of indirect costs on other
defense contracts.
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In summary, the competitive contractor teaming feature in
the ASPJ acquisition strategy has induced the same kind of contractor
behavior that the more traditional sole source contract award
strategy encourages. Because of the way the competitions are
structured, bidders are given a modest sum of money to prepare
a proposal, i.e., a prototype, etc., for which the winning bidder
can expect to receive a long term profitable production commitment.
Under such circumstances a contractor would be short-sighted
if he did not attempt to enhance his chances of winning by investing
additional company funds. Indeed, it is common knowledge that
the government is able to underfund its Advanced Development
activities. Companies are expected to invest their own funds
if they wish to be viable competitors. Given the FPI or FFP
nature of the production contracts that have been awarded on
many defense competitions, defense contractors are said to be
required to "bet their money" as a condition of winning. One
knowledgeable observer has compared the outcome of the traditional
defense acquisition strategy to the game of "liars dice. "19
An important deduction can be made concerning the efficiency
of the traditional defense acquisition strategy. Namely, so
long as competition is used at least once in the early phases
of a program then the winning contractor's profits on the entire
program will not exceed the rate of return that is normal for
a competitive industry.
Why does this hold? So long as each bidder realizes that
*9W. A. LaBerge. "Defense Acquisition
Concepts
,
5. Winter 1982, pp. 56-63.
A Game of Liar's Dice?"
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his probability of winning is directly related to the magnitude
of the investment he makes in preparing his bid, then he will
invest an amount such that the present value of the future stream
of profits he may win, weighted by his probability of winning,
is just equal to economy's competitive rate of return, i.e.,
his alternative opportunity cost. It is assumed the future
profit stream is discounted at the market interest rate., i.e.,
the bidder can borrow funds to invest at this rate and his profit
maximization requires that the marginal expected return from
his investment is just equal to the maximum rate he can earn
elsewhere in the economy. The discounted profits must be weighted
by this probability of winning; if he plays the game a number
of times, then his expected profit on the aggregate of all his
investments will just be equal to the competitive rate of return. 20
The deduction can be stated another way: An acquisition
strategy that uses competition at any point previous to the
award of a sole source contract will obtain a supply of output
for the total program that yields the supplier a rate of return
that will be equal to the competitive rate of return in the
economy. It is commonly believed that once a defense contractor
is able to maneuver himself into a sole source position he is
able to fully exploit his monopoly position. But the government
^0Ri s k averse behavior introduces only the complication that the
perceived rate of return on his investment must exceed the compe-
titive rate of return. It must also be assumed that the duration
of a competition is sufficient to permit the competitors time
to plan and implement the commitment of company resources.
Prototype competitions with "shoot-outs" are illustrative.
When the duration of a competition is excessively brief, it




is the sole buyer, i.e., a monosony, and is able to control
the contractor's pricing methods, his accounting system and
the information he must furnish to support a bid. 21
In light of the frequent and sever criticism of defense
contractors and of the traditional defense acquisition strategy,
this conclusion is quite difficult to accept. Note that it
implies that the use of competitive contractor teaming should
not yield a superior outcome. The two contractors will still
make, jointly, investments that yield only the competitive rate
of return. Nothing appears to be gained by carrying two firms
through development to compete for a share of production.
The conclusion does not mean that a defense contractor might
not make an excessively high return on his production contracts.
But the conclusion does mean that the contractor will have spent
the excess profit earlier in the program as an investment in
the activities that were necessary for him to win the competitive
phase. In other words, the effect of introducing competition
in the early phases of an acquisition strategy is to redistribute
a competitive profit within the total program's duration. It
is wrong to judge the profitability of a contractor's efforts
^L The workability of DoD's forward pricing system, which has evo
over forty years as a means to reduce transaction costs
constrain contractors' ability to exploit a sole source bargai
position, has never been investigated. It is rather surpri
to see the vast amount of research that has been done on pu
utility price determination, or administrative price determina
by the ICC, CAB or DOE when not a single study of DoD pri
practices has been published. For the efficiency of non
price determination practices see B. M. Mitchell and P
Kleindorfer, eds.
,
Regulated Industries and Public Enterpr

















by just looking at the return on his production contracts.
One must take the viewpoint of the entire program's duration
and ascertain what investments were made by the contractor early
in the program. The usual accounting practices followed by
defense contractors work against adoption of this point of view
since many investment-type expenditures are treated as expenses
in the year they are made, instead of being capitalized. Also,
a large part of a contractor's facility investment is accomplished
via leasing, which is only imperfectly reflected on the contractor's
balance sheet
.
The conclusion may appear at variance with common observations
of the course of progress on defense programs. Many, not all,
defense programs have excessive cost over-runs and schedule
slippages, especially early in the production phase. The SAR
system of contract performance reporting was established at
the direction of Congress just because of the ubiquity of over-
runs and schedule slippages. How can this be accommodated in
the analysis of acquisition efficiency?
There are at least two ways to explain these cost variances.
Only one of them seems plausible. The implausible one is that a
contractor is able to manipulate and control the pace of technical
progress on his contract and thus to increase the scope of the
effort. But is it implausible to assume such an extreme asymmetry
in knowledge on the parts of the government buyer and the supplier.
A more plausible explanation is that neither the contractor nor
the government fully comprehend the technical advances required
to fulfill the promises made during the earlier competition.
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This is a disconcerting argument. It implies that competition
in the early phases of a program was no better than a lottery.
No party to the competitive transaction fully understands what
is required nor the effort needed to realize the stated technical
objectives. The competitive award is based on trivial or ephemeral
grounds. The writer has no reason to believe the ASPJ competition
was not conducted in a knowledgeable manner. 22 The purpose,
again, is to explain why large cost over-runs occur during the
production phase of some weapon system acquisitions. However,
on other development competitions that the author has investigated
there were certainly obvious gaps in technical awareness for
some of them. The contract may have been awarded to the firm
with the superior technical approach, but the award was given
for specious reasons. 23
WHY SOLE SOURCE PRODUCTION MAY BE MOST EFFICIENT
It was suggested earlier that a sole source acquisition
strategy may be more efficient than a contractor teaming arrangement,
and not only just as efficient. This is for two possible reasons.
First, economies of scale may result in substantial savings in
production. Second, and more importantly, introduction of a second
^It was not possible to obtain the RFP or technical documentation
that was used in the competitive phase. One can only infer
from subsequent events, and, perhaps, insufficient evidence
has accumulated to date.
^Development competitions are always conducted on a premise that
sufficient information is produced during the competition to
permit identification of a winner. A badly needed improvement
in development competitions is to introduce as a possible course
of action either a continuation of the competition or a declaration
that no winner can be identified based on the information available.
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source may lead to lower prices in the short run but much higher
prices in the long run. Each reason will now be discussed.
Economies of scale
An effort was made to determine if estimated production
costs for the ASPJ could be significantly reduced when the monthly
rate of production was doubled, i.e., only a single source.
The response indicated that unit costs would only be constant,
i.e., no economies of scale were anticipated. Of course, it
is not clear at this early point in the ASPJ program if production
will be located at existing facilities or entirely new facilities
will be constructed. In any case, the size of the production
run is inadequate to warrant a facility sized to produced only
the ASFJ. Thus, any economies of scale will take on more the
economies of scope, since a production facility will have to
be able to accommodate the production of a variety of electronic
subassemblies and equipments.
Yet economies of scale should be an important consideration
in ASPJ production planning. The efforts by DoD to standardize
electronic equipment production methods allows the widespread
use of automated processes and insertion fixtures. 24 l n common
with some 200 other DoD acquisition programs for which electronic
equipment is an important part, the ASPJ program is constrained
to use the technology insertion capabilities of VLSI devices.
Again, the commercial electronics production appears to be ahead




of defense electronic production in adoption of automated production
lines. The new Apple Computer Company's factory for producing its
Macintosh personal computer illustrates the point. Another example
is IBM's approach to the production of its personal computer.
To be sure, the size of the entire production run for the
ASPJ is equivalent to only a few days' production of a successful
commercial electronics product. Yet the degree of standardization
in chip size, printed circuit board dimensions and assembly
procedures suggests that the economies of scope should be signifi-
cant. A contractor who is simultaneously producing assemblies
on a number of different defense contracts should be able to
realize production economies using a common manufacturing facility.
Certainly, the size of the investment required to construct
a modern electronics manufacturing facility suggests that two
producers will be much more expensive than one. 25
Short and Long Run Effects of Introducing a Second Source
A number of investigations support a finding that introduction
of a second source will result in an immediate price reduction
followed by continued price reductions on subsequent competitions . 26
There is a subsequent ial dispersion in the expected price reduction,
however. There may even be price increases. Satisfactory
explanation of either the expected price reduction or the large




2oThe relevant literature is summarized in P. M. Carrick, "Limitation
on Competition in Defense Procurement," Institute for Defense
Analysis, P-1533, November 1980.
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dispersion do not exist. Conceptually, in a commercial setting
a sole production source should attempt to deter entry by erecting
barriers to discourage a potential entrant. 27 This should lead
a sole source to a pricing policy that will be capable of sustaining
the monopoly. 28 "Riding the yield curve" is a recognized business
strategy. If entry is to be discouraged when the sole source knows
that entry barriers are controlled by the buyer, the adopted pricing
policy cannot allow the monopolist more than a competitive return. 29
There is an obvious sharp clash between what has been observed
in defense acquisitions and the theoretical economic literature.
No simple explanation for this discrepancy is possible. Some
of the cases where large price reductions were observed may
be due to X-inef f iciencies on the part of the sole source, i.e.,
the sole source may. have adopted inefficient production methods
which resulted in his excessively high production costs. But
there is another explanation possible. Namely, the price reduction
in the short run may disappear in the long run.
The basis for this line of explanation turns on the difficulties
of a firm exiting from production commitments. It is plausible
to expect a firm to deploy its resources so that the marginal
return from each business area it pursues will yield the same
expected marginal return (not the same average return per business
area). As explained earlier, a defense contractor makes a subsidy
27See Avinash Dixit, "Recent Developments in Oligopoly theory,"
American Economic Review
,
7 2, May 1982.
28 Baumol, et al
.
, op. cit., pp. 279-310.
29lbid.
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(investment) during the early competitive phases of a program
to enhance his opportunity of winning a production contract.
He then prices his production effort to provide a competitively
acceptable return. But if a second source is introduced unex-
pectedly, the new producer will be able to achieve a competitive
return at a lower price because he will not have made the earlier
investment. But this is only true for the short run, however.
The original source will be forced to match the reduced price
and, in doing so, will receive less than a competitive return.
As soon as the original supplier is able to extricate himself
from the production commitment, i.e., to exit from a program's
production commitments, he will probably not use his old strategy
again. He will now either make smaller investments during the
competitive development phase or set prices for his sole sourced
production to obtain a high return during the time period before
a second source is introduced.
Note that when a sole supplier expects a second source to
be introduced during the production phase, the apparent magnitude
of the competitive savings may appear very large because the
sole source's initial price will have been set quite high.
Thus, over time the apparent magnitude of savings from introducing
a second source should be increasing. However, a correct measure
of competitive savings requires the calculation to be based
upon a program's total revenue, expense and investment streams.
The prediction is, then, that the savings from introducing a
second source will tend to zero in the long run. Given the
recent popularity of second sourcing, defense firms may have
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already adjusted their expectations and pricing practices to
reflect the inevitability of competitive production conditions.
The inference is, then, that the savings from introducing a
second source are only short run in nature. They can only occur
when the introduction of a second source is unexpected. Suppliers
will adjust their behavior and the deployment of their resources
to assure a long run competitive return. Competitive savings
appear to occur only because of the sole source's large sunk costs. 30
When competitive contractor teaming is used, neither producer
is equivalent to a sole source supplier. Each firm can expect
to obtain only a share of the total procurement. Sunk costs
will still be an important factor and both firms might be induced
to accept a lower price in the short run than will adequately
compensate them in the long run for all their costs of doing
business. But if the firm's earlier expectations as to their
market shares are correct, then the prices they received should
also be adequate for encouraging continued investments. It
would only be when the sales expectations of one of the suppliers
is not met that any reluctance to continue would occur. But
this additional uncertainty should exact a price. Each member
of a competitive team should require a higher return than would
be required by a sole source supplier to compensate for the
additional uncertainty concerning market share. Thus, a competitive
contracting team arrangement may result in higher prices than
if a sole source procurement were used.
3 uThe importance of sunk costs in explaining firm behavior is
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